Concerning Mixed Principalities
BUT the
difficulties occur in a new
principality. And firstly, if it be not entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which, taken collectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly from an inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities; for men change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and this hope induces them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein they are
deceived, because they afterwards find by
experience they have
gone from bad to worse. This follows also on another natural and common necessity, which always causes a new prince to burden those who have submitted to him with his soldiery and with
infinite other hardships which he must put upon his
new acquisition.
In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in seizing that principality, and you are not able to keep those
friends who put you there because of your not being able to satisfy them in the way they
expected, and you cannot take
strong measures against them, feeling bound to them. For, although one may be very strong in
armed forces, yet in entering a province one has always need of the
goodwill of the natives.
For these reasons
Louis XII,
King of France, quickly occupied
Milan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it only needed Lodovico's own forces; because those who had opened the gates to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future benefit, would not endure the ill-treatment of the new
prince. It is very true that, after acquiring
rebellious provinces a second time, they are not so lightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with little reluctance, takes the opportunity of the rebellion to punish the
delinquents, to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen himself in the weakest places. Thus to cause
France to lose
Milan the first time it was enough for the
Duke Lodovico to raise insurrections on the borders; but to cause him to lose it a second time it was necessary to bring the whole world against him, and that his armies should be defeated and driven out of Italy; which followed from the causes above mentioned.
Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the second time. The general
reasons for the first have been discussed; it remains to name those for the second, and to see what
resources he had, and what any one in his situation would have had for maintaining himself more securely in his
acquisition than did the King of France.
Now I say that those
dominions which, when acquired, are added to an ancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same
country and
language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold them, especially when they have not been accustomed to
self-government; and to hold them securely it is enough to have
destroyed the family of the
prince who was ruling them; because the two peoples,
preserving in other things the old conditions, and not being unlike in customs, will live quietly together, as one has seen in
Brittany,
Burgundy,
Gascony, and
Normandy, which have been bound to France for so long a time: and, although there may be some difference in
language, nevertheless the customs are alike, and the people will easily be able to get on amongst themselves. He who has
annexed them, if he wishes to hold them, has only to bear in mind two
considerations: the one, that the family of their former lord is
extinguished; the other, that neither their
laws nor their
taxes are
altered, so that in a very short time they will become entirely one body with the old
principality.
But when states are acquired in a country differing in language, customs, or laws, there are
difficulties, and
good fortune and great energy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real helps would be that he who has acquired them should go and
reside there. This would make his position more
secure and durable, as it has made that of the
Turk in Greece, who,
notwithstanding all the other measures taken by him for holding that state, if he had not settled there, would not have been able to
keep it. Because, if one is on the spot,
disorders are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly remedy them; but if one is not at hand, they heard of only when they are one can no longer remedy them. Besides this, the country is not
pillaged by your
officials; the subjects are satisfied by prompt recourse to the prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have more cause to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, to
fear him. He who would attack that state from the outside must have the
utmost caution; as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested from him with the greatest difficulty.
The other and better course is to send
colonies to one or two places, which may be as keys to that state, for it
necessary either to do this or else to keep there a great number of
cavalry and
infantry. A prince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense he can send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority only of the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them to the new inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining
poor and
scattered, are never able to
injure him; whilst the rest being uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious not to err for fear it should happen to them as it has to those who have been
despoiled. In conclusion, I say that these colonies are not costly, they are more
faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as has been said, I being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one has to remark that men ought either to be
well treated or
crushed, because they can avenge themselves of lighter injuries, of more serious ones they cannot; therefore the injury that is to be done to a man ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in
fear of revenge.
But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends much more, having to consume on the
garrison all
income from the state, so that the
acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are exasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the shifting of the garrison up and down all become acquainted with
hardship, and all become
hostile, and
they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their own ground, are yet able to do
hurt. For every reason, therefore, such
guards are as useless as a
colony is useful.
Again, the prince who holds a
country differing in the above respects ought to make himself the head and
defender of his
powerful neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care that no
foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a footing there; for it will always happen that such a one will be introduced by those who are
discontented, either through excess of
ambition or
through fear, as one has seen already. The
Romans were brought into
Greece by the
Aetolians; and in every other country where they obtained a footing they were brought in by the
inhabitants. And the usual course of affairs is that, as soon as a powerful foreigner enters a country, all the subject states are drawn to him, moved by the hatred which they feel against the ruling power. So that in respect to these subject states he has not to take any trouble to gain them over to himself, for the whole of them quickly rally to the state which he has acquired there. He has only to take care that they do not get hold of too much power and too much
authority, and then with his own forces, and with their
goodwill, he can easily keep down the more powerful of them, so as to remain entirely
master in the country. And he who does not properly manage this business will soon lose what he has acquired, and whilst he does hold it he will have endless difficulties and troubles.
The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely these measures; they sent colonies and maintained
friendly relations with the
minor powers, without increasing their
strength; they kept down the greater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain authority. Greece appears to me sufficient for an example. The
Achaeans and
Aetolians were kept friendly by them, the kingdom of
Macedonia was humbled,
Antiochus was driven out; yet the merits of the Achaeans and Aetolians never secured for them permission to increase their power, nor did the persuasions of
Philip ever induce the Romans to be his friends without first humbling him, nor did the influence of Antiochus make them agree that he should retain any lordship over the country. Because the Romans did in these instances what all prudent princes ought to do, who have to regard not only present troubles, but also future ones, for which they must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, it is easy to remedy them; but if you wait until they approach, the
medicine is no longer in time because the
malady has become incurable; for it happens in this, as the
physicians say it happens in hectic fever, that in the beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but difficult to detect, but in the course of time, not having been either detected or treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect but difficult to cure. Thus it happens in
affairs of state, for when the
evils that arise have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise man to see), they can be quickly
redressed, but when, through not having been foreseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way that every one can see them. there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, the Romans, foreseeing troubles, dealt with them at once, and, even to
avoid a war, would not let them come to a head, for they knew that war is not to be avoided, but is only put off to the advantage of others; moreover they wished to fight with Philip and Antiochus in Greece so as not to have to do it in
Italy; they could have
avoided both, but this they did not
wish; nor did that ever please them which is for ever in the mouths of the wise ones of our time:-
Let us enjoy the benefits of the time- but rather the benefits of their own valour and
prudence, for time drives
everything before it, and is able to bring with it good as well as evil, and evil as well as good.
But let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of the things mentioned. I will speak of
Louis XII (and not of
Charles VIII) as the one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having held possession of Italy for the
longest period; and you will see that he has done the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain a state composed of
divers elements.
King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the
Venetians, who desired to obtain half the state of
Lombardy by his intervention. I will not blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get a foothold in Italy, and having no friends there- seeing rather that every door was shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles- he was forced to accept those
friendships which he could get, and he would have succeeded very quickly in his design if in other matters he had not made some
mistakes. The king, however, having acquired Lombardy, regained at once the authority which Charles had lost:
Genoa yielded; the
Florentines became his friends; the
Marquess of Mantua, the
Duke of Ferrara, the
Bentivoglio,
my lady of Forli,
the Lords of Faenza, of
Pesaro, of
Rimini, of
Camerino, of
Piombino, the
Lucchesi, the
Pisans, the
Sienese- everybody made advances to him to become his friend. Then could the
Venetians realize the rashness of the course taken by them, which, in order that they might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made the king master of two-thirds of Italy.
Let any one now consider with what little difficulty the king could have maintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules above laid down, and kept all his friends secure and protected; for although they were numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the Church, some of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been forced to stand in with him, and by their means he could easily have made himself secure against those who remained powerful. But he was no sooner in Milan than he did the contrary by assisting
Pope Alexander to occupy the
Romagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he was
weakening himself, depriving himself of friends and those who had thrown themselves into his
lap, whilst he
aggrandized the
Church by adding much
temporal power to the
spiritual, thus giving it great authority. And having committed this
prime error, he was obliged to follow it up, so much so that, to put an end to the ambition of
Alexander, and to prevent his becoming the master of
Tuscany, he was himself forced to come into Italy.
And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and deprived himself friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of
Naples, divides it with the
King of Spain, and where he was the prime arbiter of Italy he takes an associate, so that the ambitious of that country and the
malcontents of his own should have where to shelter; and whereas he could have left in the kingdom his own pensioner as
king, he drove him out, to put one there who was able to drive him, Louis, out in turn.
The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not
blamed; but when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, then there is folly and blame.
Therefore, if France could have attacked
Naples with her own forces she ought to have done so; if she could not, then she ought not to have divided it. And if the partition which she made with the Venetians in Lombardy was justified by the excuse that by it she got a foothold in Italy, this other partition merited blame, for it had not the excuse of that
necessity.
Therefore Louis made these
five errors: he destroyed the
minor powers, he increased the strength of one of the
greater powers in Italy, he brought in a foreign power, he did not
settle in the country, he did not send
colonies. Which errors, if he had lived, were not enough to injure him had he not made a
sixth by taking away their
dominions from the Venetians; because, had he not aggrandized the Church, nor brought Spain into Italy, it would have been very reasonable and necessary to humble them; but having first taken these steps, he ought never to have consented to their ruin, for they, being
powerful, would always have kept off others from designs on Lombardy, to which the Venetians would never have consented except to become masters themselves there; also because the others would not wish to take Lombardy from France in order to give it to the Venetians, and to run counter to both they would not have had the
courage.
And if any one should say: King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexander and the kingdom to Spain to
avoid war, I answer for the reasons given above that a
blunder ought never be
perpetrated to avoid war, because it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to your
disadvantage. And if another should allege the pledge which the king had given to the Pope that he would assist him in the
enterprise, in
exchange for the dissolution of his marriage and for the hat to Rouen, to that I reply what I shall write later on concerning the faith of princes, and how it ought to be kept.
Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the conditions observed by those who have taken
possession of countries and wished to retain them. Nor is there any
miracle in this, but much that is reasonable and
quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at Nantes with Rouen, when Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope Alexander, was usually called, occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal Rouen observing to me that the Italians did not understand
war, I replied to him that the French did not understand
statecraft, meaning that otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach such greatness. And in fact it has been seen that the greatness of the Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and her ruin may be
attributed to them. From this a general rule is drawn which never or rarely
fails: that he who is the cause of another becoming powerful is ruined; because that
predominancy has been brought about either by
astuteness or else by force, and both are
distrusted by him who has been
raised to power.
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