On
October 24, 1918, President
Woodrow Wilson addressed the people through a press release devoted entirely to the
Congressional elections less than two weeks away. He asked for the election of
Democratic majorities in both
House of Congress, not because “any
political party is paramount in matters of
patriotism,” but because the times demand a “unified leadership, and that a
Republican Congress would divide the leadership….. The return of a Republican majority to either House of Congress would, moreover, be interpreted on the other side of the water as a repudiation of my leadership…. It is well understood there as well as here that Republican leaders desire not so much to support the President to control him.” This was a most unfortunate and
impolitic message. Unfortunate because the opportunity for successful compromise with the Republicans on plans for the peace should have been obvious to the President. There was no need to picture a successful treaty as something only Democrats could achieve. Whatever the outcome of the Congressional elections,
bipartisan participation in the task of building the peace held the greatest compromise. Impolitic because Wilson must have known that his message to the
people might be resented by them as an attempt to wield undue
influence in
state affairs. His appeal for
Democratic congress backfired. The Republicans won the House by 50 seats and the Senate by 2. According to his own words the President had been “
repudiated” in the eyes of the governments of the
Allies. Two weeks after the election he announced that he was going to
Paris for the
Peace Conference. A substantial objection to his trip was that, among the four advisors he had selected to go with him, only one was a Republican and none were
Senators. If he came back with a
treaty it would be the Senate that would either ratify it, or refuse to! Famous
African-American writer
W.E.B. Du Bois commented on Wilson’s greed. “Because of the
idiotic way in which the stubbornness of Woodrow Wilson and the political fortunes of the Republicans became involved, the
United States was not represented. But despite its tumult and shouting this
nation must join and join on the terms which the
World lays down. The idea that we single-handed can dictate terms to the World or stay out of the World, is an idea born of the folly of
fools.” But of course, Wilson took no heed to the strong words. (See my w/u on
Woodrow Wilson).
Wilson negotiated with Clemenceau of France, Lloyd George of Great Britain, and Orlando of Italy. These men, the Big Four, made most of the decisions. In order to get the League of Nations written into the treaty, Wilson gave in on some terms neither he nor the United States approved. He made the point that some inequities and mistakes, as we saw them, could be corrected later through the League of Nations as time proved them to be unwise. Wilson was a tough bargainer. He prevented France from annexing the Saar, kept Italy from getting Fiume, kept the Poles from getting East Prussia, stopped France from annexing the German Rhineland, and agreed to give Shantung to Japan only with a pledge it would be soon given to China- as it was in 1921. There was nothing wrong with Wilson as a strong representative of the United States at the peace table: the trouble was that he did not have at least two Republican Senators with him.
The bulk of the Versailles Treaty was the Covenant of the League of Nations. Other terms included the forced admission guilt by Germany for the war, the return of Alsace-Lorraine to France, the Saar Basin (rich in iron and coal) was put under the League of Nations for 15 years, after which the people could vote, to go with either France or Germany; Danzig was made a Free City (To give Poland a seaport); the German Rhineland was demilitarized; and German colonies were mandated under the League of Nations. The ratification of this treaty, with the Covenant of the League of Nations as the heart of it, became the great debate of the campaign of 1920.