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94. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk and the Director of the U.S. Information Agency (Murrow) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, June 8, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 761.00/6-861. Official Use
Only. Drafted by Armitage.
An Effective Countertheme to "Peaceful Coexistence"
In the period since early 1956 the Soviets have transformed the concept
and phrase, "peaceful coexistence," into a useful political tool by assiduous
and continuous propagation at all levels of the government and party apparatus.
They have gained abroad a substantial measure of acceptance of this concept
as a legitimate objective, not only of their foreign policy but of other
countries. It appears as such in repeated joint communiqués of the
Soviet Union and other countries and all too frequently in the speeches
and conversations of leading political figures, particularly but not exclusively,
from the uncommitted countries.
We have attempted to combat it by pointing out both the hypocrisy and true
meaning of its major tenets and by indicating that it is nothing more than
a Soviet rationalization for using every measure of struggle against the
free world except nuclear warfare. Toward this end we have made occasional
public speeches and have instructed our posts abroad to disseminate our views
of it. This has been manifestly inadequate. In the field of propaganda one
simply can not beat something with nothing.
We have needed a single, simple countertheme if we are to do the job. After
a long study of the possible alternatives, we have concluded that "peaceful
world community" is the most effective phrase we can find. Although this phrase
seems to embody the essence of our basic foreign objectives, we recognize
that neither it nor any other single phrase will magically accomplish our
purposes. If, however, we devote the same degree of attention and effort to
it that the Soviets give to "peaceful coexistence," we should be able to invest
it with meaningful content, achieve an increasing measure of understanding
of the difference between our and the Soviet concept and have some success
in associating other countries with our view. "Peaceful world community" also
helps us in our efforts to emphasize that "general and complete disarmament"
is not an end in itself but an important component of a larger aim. John McCloy
quite independently used the exact phrase for that purpose in his conversation
with Gromyko./2/ USIA is instructing all its
media to employ the term whenever it is appropriate.
/2/Not further identified.
If you approve of this phrase and of its employment in the manner indicated, we will give some thought as to how it can be most auspiciously launched.
Edward R. Murrow/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears Rusk's stamped signature and Murrow's typed signature with an indication that both signed the original memorandum.
95. Paper Prepared in the Department of State/1/
Washington, June 12, 1961.
/1/Source: Yale University, Bowles Papers, Box 300, Folder 535. Secret.
The source text bears no drafting or clearance information, but according
to another copy it was drafted by Armitage and cleared by Bohlen and Kohler.
(Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/6-1261) The Department of State
prepared this paper in response to a request by Bundy for a talking point
paper to debrief the National Security Council on the Vienna talks. (Memorandum,
June 10; ibid., 611.61/6-1061)
TALKING POINTS REVIEWING CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENT
KENNEDY AND CHAIRMAN KHRUSHCHEV
(June 3-4, 1961)
Overall U.S.-Soviet Relations
1. President began talks with expression of hope conversations would be
useful and provide better understanding of problems confronting the two countries.
2. President said common objective should be to conduct competition of two
systems without endangering peace. Problem is to find means of avoiding
situations in which two countries become committed to actions involving their
security. President stressed this point repeatedly.
3. Khrushchev stated desire for improved relations but not at expense other
people. Referred to lack of direct conflict in economic field. Stressed need
for solution basic questions, failing which tensions would continue: West
must recognize de facto that Communism exists and has won right to develop.
In luncheon toast Khrushchev decried idea of mutual concessions in negotiation,
asking what could he concede and saying concession of even a portion of peace
would mean no peace at all.
4. Khrushchev expounded on eventual Communist triumph through spread of
ideas; claimed challenge lay in force economic example and in political arena;
gave "guarantee" USSR would not try to propagate ideas by use of nuclear
missiles; denied intent to use force of arms or impose its system on others.
5. President said USSR seeks to eliminate free system while objecting to
any efforts of others to eliminate Communist system in the bloc. Rejected
idea of historical inevitability of Communist triumph, defended the right
of free popular choice.
6. Khrushchev tried to interpret the President's position as an effort to justify resort to arms to oppose the spread of Communist ideas.
1. President outlined mutual danger of miscalculation. Cited historical examples
and emphasized importance of considering views and positions of other side
before embarking on a course of action.
2. Khrushchev said miscalculation is vague term, Soviets can not guarantee
Communist ideas won't spread. Term can be applied to both sides. USSR will
defend its vital interests, can not be intimidated. USSR appreciates loss
to both sides which war would bring but use of term "miscalculation" does
not affect the USSR.
1. Khrushchev brought up China but stated he was not authorized to speak
for the Chinese Communists. Urged the President to adopt a "reasonable"
course by recognizing the Chinese Communists. Termed Chinese Communists' exclusion
from the UN "unrealistic" but said Chinese Communists would never join the
UN if the Chinese Nationalists were still there.
2. He termed present U.S. policy toward Chinese Communists unreasonable and
said it might ultimately lead to war. Urged the U.S. to settle its problems
with the Chinese Communists and end the "occupation" of Taiwan.
3. Khrushchev probed for possible changes in U.S.-China policy but President
left him under no illusions that change could be expected. The President cited
the constant hostility of the Chinese Communists towards the U.S. and acknowledged
U.S. relations with Chinese Communists were indeed bad. He stressed that U.S.
strategic interests were involved in the U.S. position on Taiwan and said
that he considered the security of the U.S. involved as well.
Underdeveloped and Uncommitted Areas
1. Khrushchev denied responsibility for popular uprisings against "tyrannical
regimes" and charged U.S. supported military dictators and opposed social
change. Cited Cuba, Iran, Pakistan, South Korea, Turkey, Spain,
Angola. He said USSR supports the aspirations of the people.
2. Khrushchev referred to Cuba, said Castro is not a Communist but U.S.
policy could make him one. Termed President's statement that U.S. security
threatened dangerous. If U.S. free to act in Cuba, what of Turkey and Iran;
miscalculation possible in such situation.
3. President explained U.S. attitude toward Cuba, stressing Castro's
destruction of right of free choice and his stated intent to use Cuba as base
for expansion in neighboring area.
4. President asked Soviet attitude should West-oriented government be installed in Poland, said social and political changes in the world should take place in ways not involving national security, treaty commitments or prestige of two countries.
5. Khrushchev said Castro would be removed as Batista was if he failed to give the Cubans freedom. Our countries should not intervene. Added that under influence of Soviet aid Castro might turn Communist but Khrushchev could not now see which way Castro would go.
6. President sketched three U.S. interests: free choice through elections
for all people; defense of our strategic interests (Spain, Yugoslavia);
events in next decade not greatly disturbing the balance of power (referred
to effect of Chinese Communist development of military potential).
1. President expressed support for liberation movement in Africa, noted
we had rankled allies to sustain this position.
2. Khrushchev replied U.S. position is basically anti-liberation, pro-allies.
3. President referred to Khrushchev's January speech and support of wars
of national liberation. Stated that problem was how to avoid direct contact
between two countries as we support respective groups; referred to Viet-Nam
guerrilla activity and said we do not believe they represent popular will.
4. Khrushchev said people's only recourse often to arms, cited Algeria
and Angola. Called them "sacred" wars. Affirmed Soviet support but tried
to deny direct Soviet participation.
5. President said we were concerned also with what followed nation-hood
in such areas. Balance of power could be disturbed if they associated closely
6. Khrushchev charged this meant U.S. could not recognize neutrality unless
it followed U.S., said that if some African country went Communist this
would be expression of popular will and our interference could set off chain
reaction and lead to war.
7. President said situation in Burma, India and Yugoslavia satisfactory
8. President referred again to Poland to illustrate problem of close association
of neighboring country with antagonistic power. Mentioned the question of
popular support and this led to pointed exchange with Khrushchev on question
of popularity of Polish Government.
1. Khrushchev said both sides supplying arms in Laos. Side USSR supporting
has popular support and would win out, like Mao vs. Chiang in China.
2. Both agreed Laos not strategically very important, but President noted our treaty commitments in the area and with reference to Laos.
3. Khrushchev took exception to reference to commitments, said U.S. could
not assert special rights and dispense indulgences, as forces in world now
4. President noted U.S. and USSR had expressed desire for neutral and independent
Laos, referred to Cambodia and Burma to illustrate meaning of those
terms. Khrushchev assented.
5. President emphasized primary need for effective verification of cease-fire,
citing reports of violation and need for new instructions to ICC.
6. Khrushchev digressed on anti-popular regimes again and said U.S. talks
too much of anti-guerrilla warfare and such talk dangerous. Said guerrilla
success dependent on local support, could not be gained from outside the country.
Interference from outside could bring war and terrible prospect of mutual
7. Khrushchev said USSR would not agree to ICC becoming a kind of supra-government;
three sides must agree among themselves regarding a cease-fire and U.S. and
USSR could use influence to bring agreement about. Gromyko added ICC could
act by agreement of Laotian parties. Khrushchev said basic question of formation
of Laotian government should not be contingent on a cease-fire.
8. Khrushchev alleged and President denied U.S. had ordered and then recalled
order for a Marine landing in Laos.
9. President stressed need of avoiding a situation which could lead to retaliation and counter-retaliation and thus endanger peace.
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES - 1961-1963 - Volume V - Soviet Union P55