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Part III.
When
Hannibal marched from Gaul into Italy, he was obliged, first to discover, and then to open, a way over mountains, and
through savage nations, that had never yielded a passage to a regular army.
53 The
Alps were then guarded by nature, they
are now fortified by art.
Citadels, constructed with no less skill than labor and expense, command every avenue into the plain,
and on that side render Italy almost inaccessible to the enemies of the king of Sardinia.
54 But in the course of the intermediate
period, the generals, who have attempted the passage, have seldom experienced any difficulty or resistance. In the age of
Constantine, the peasants of the mountains were civilized and obedient subjects; the country was plentifully stocked with
provisions, and the stupendous highways, which the Romans had carried over the Alps, opened several communications
between Gaul and Italy.
55 Constantine preferred the road of the Cottian Alps, or, as it is now called, of
Mount Cenis, and
led his troops with such active diligence, that he descended into the plain of
Piedmont before the court of Maxentius had
received any certain intelligence of his departure from the banks of the
Rhine. The city of
Susa, however, which is situated at
the foot of Mount Cenis, was surrounded with walls, and provided with a garrison sufficiently numerous to check the progress
of an invader; but the impatience of Constantine's troops disdained the tedious forms of a siege.
The same day that they
appeared before Susa, they applied fire to the gates, and ladders to the walls; and mounting to the assault amidst a shower of
stones and arrows, they entered the place sword in hand, and cut in pieces the greatest part of the garrison. The flames were
extinguished by the care of Constantine, and the remains of Susa preserved from total destruction. About forty miles from
thence, a more severe contest awaited him. A numerous army of Italians was assembled under the lieutenants of Maxentius, in
the plains of
Turin. Its principal strength consisted in a species of heavy
cavalry, which the Romans, since the decline of their
discipline, had borrowed from the nations of the East. The horses, as well as the men, were clothed in complete
armor, the
joints of which were artfully adapted to the motions of their bodies. The aspect of this cavalry was formidable, their weight
almost irresistible; and as, on this occasion, their generals had drawn them up in a compact
column or
wedge, with a sharp
point, and with spreading flanks, they flattered themselves that they could easily break and trample down the army of
Constantine. They might, perhaps, have succeeded in their design, had not their experienced adversary embraced the same
method of defence, which in similar circumstances had been practised by Aurelian. The skilful evolutions of Constantine divided
and baffled this massy column of cavalry. The troops of
Maxentius fled in confusion towards Turin; and as the gates of the city
were shut against them, very few escaped the sword of the victorious pursuers. By this important service, Turin deserved to
experience the clemency and even favor of the conqueror. He made his entry into the Imperial palace of
Milan, and almost all
the cities of Italy between the Alps and the Po not only acknowledged the power, but embraced with zeal the party, of
Constantine.
56
Footnote 53: The three principal passages of the Alps between Gaul and Italy, are those of Mount St. Bernard, Mount Cenis,
and Mount Genevre. Tradition, and a resemblance of names, (Alpes Penninoe,) had assigned the first of these for the march of
Hannibal, (see Simler de Alpibus.) The Chevalier de Folard (Polyp. tom. iv.) and M. d'Anville have led him over Mount
Genevre. But notwithstanding the authority of an experienced officer and a learned geographer, the pretensions of Mount Cenis
are supported in a specious, not to say a convincing, manner, by M. Grosley. Observations sur l'Italie, tom. i. p. 40, &c. *
Footnote *: The dissertation of Messrs. Cramer and Wickham has clearly shown that the Little St. Bernard must claim the
honor of Hannibal's passage. Mr. Long (London, 1831) has added some sensible corrections re Hannibal's march to the Alps.
- M
Footnote 54: La Brunette near Suse, Demont, Exiles, Fenestrelles, Coni, &c.
Footnote 55: See Ammian. Marcellin. xv. 10.
His description of the roads over the Alps is clear, lively, and accurate.
Footnote 56: Zosimus as well as Eusebius hasten from the passage of the Alps to the decisive action near Rome. We must
apply to the two Panegyrics for the intermediate actions of Constantine.
From
Milan to
Rome, the Aemilian and Flaminian highways offered an easy march of about four hundred miles; but though
Constantine was impatient to encounter the tyrant, he prudently directed his operations against another army of Italians, who,
by their strength and position, might either oppose his progress, or, in case of a misfortune, might intercept his retreat. Ruricius
Pompeianus, a general distinguished by his valor and ability, had under his command the city of Verona, and all the troops that
were stationed in the province of
Venetia. As soon as he was informed that Constantine was advancing towards him, he
detached a large body of cavalry which was defeated in an engagement near
Brescia, and pursued by the Gallic legions as far
as the gates of
Verona. The necessity, the importance, and the difficulties of the siege of Verona, immediately presented
themselves to the sagacious mind of Constantine.
57 The city was accessible only by a narrow peninsula towards the west, as
the other three sides were surrounded by the
Adige, a rapid river, which covered the province of Venetia, from whence the
besieged derived an inexhaustible supply of men and provisions. It was not without great difficulty, and after several fruitless
attempts, that Constantine found means to pass the river at some distance above the city, and in a place where the torrent was
less violent. He then encompassed Verona with strong lines, pushed his attacks with prudent vigor, and repelled a desperate
sally of
Pompeianus. That intrepid general, when he had used every means of defence that the strength of the place or that of
the garrison could afford, secretly escaped from Verona, anxious not for his own, but for the public safety. With indefatigable
diligence he soon collected an army sufficient either to meet Constantine in the field, or to attack him if he obstinately remained
within his lines. The emperor, attentive to the motions, and informed of the approach of so formidable an enemy, left a part of
his legions to continue the operations of the siege, whilst, at the head of those troops on whose valor and fidelity he more
particularly depended, he advanced in person to engage the general of
Maxentius. The army of Gaul was drawn up in two lines,
according to the usual practice of war; but their experienced leader, perceiving that the numbers of the Italians far exceeded his
own, suddenly changed his disposition, and, reducing the second, extended the front of his first line to a just proportion with
that of the enemy. Such evolutions, which only veteran troops can execute without confusion in a moment of danger, commonly
prove decisive; but as this engagement began towards the close of the day, and was contested with great obstinacy during the
whole night, there was less room for the conduct of the generals than for the courage of the soldiers. The return of light
displayed the victory of Constantine, and a field of
carnage covered with many thousands of the vanquished Italians. Their
general, Pompeianus, was found among the slain;
Verona immediately surrendered at discretion, and the garrison was made
prisoners of war.
58 When the officers of the victorious army congratulated their master on this important success, they
ventured to add some respectful complaints, of such a nature, however, as the most jealous monarchs will listen to without
displeasure. They represented to Constantine, that, not contented with all the duties of a commander, he had exposed his own
person with an excess of valor which almost degenerated into rashness; and they conjured him for the future to pay more
regard to the preservation of a life in which the safety of Rome and of the empire was involved.
59
Footnote 57: The Marquis
Maffei has examined the siege and battle of Verona with that degree of attention and accuracy which was due to a memorable
action that happened in his native country. The fortifications of that city, constructed by Gallienus, were less extensive than the
modern walls, and the amphitheatre was not included within their circumference. See Verona Illustrata, part i. p. 142 150.
Footnote 58: They wanted chains for so great a multitude of captives; and the whole council was at a loss; but the sagacious
conqueror imagined the happy expedient of converting into fetters the swords of the vanquished. Panegyr. Vet. ix. 11.
Footnote 59: Panegyr. Vet. ix. 11.
While Constantine signalized his conduct and valor in the field, the sovereign of Italy appeared insensible of the calamities and
danger of a
civil war which reigned in the heart of his dominions. Pleasure was still the only business of Maxentius. Concealing,
or at least attempting to conceal, from the public knowledge the misfortunes of his arms,
60v he indulged himself in a vain
confidence which deferred the remedies of the approaching evil, without deferring the evil itself.
61 vThe rapid progress of
Constantine
62vvv was scarcely sufficient to awaken him from his fatal security; he flattered himself, that his well-known liberality,
and the majesty of the Roman name, which had already delivered him from two invasions, would dissipate with the same facility
the rebellious army of Gaul. The officers of experience and ability, who had served under the banners of
Maximian, were at
length compelled to inform his effeminate son of the imminent danger to which he was reduced; and, with a freedom that at
once surprised and convinced him, to urge the necessity of preventing his ruin, by a vigorous exertion of his remaining power.
The resources of Maxentius, both of men and money, were still considerable. The Praetorian guards felt how strongly their own
interest and safety were connected with his cause; and a third army was soon collected, more numerous than those which had
been lost in the battles of Turin and Verona. It was far from the intention of the emperor to lead his troops in person. A stranger
to the exercises of war, he trembled at the apprehension of so dangerous a contest; and as fear is commonly superstitious, he
listened with melancholy attention to the rumors of omens and presages which seemed to menace his life and empire.
Shame at
length supplied the place of courage, and forced him to take the field. He was unable to sustain the contempt of the Roman
people. The
circus resounded with their indignant clamors, and they tumultuously besieged the gates of the palace, reproaching
the pusillanimity of their indolent sovereign, and celebrating the heroic spirit of Constantine.
63 Before Maxentius left Rome,
he consulted the
Sibylline books. The guardians of these ancient oracles were as well versed in the arts of this world as they
were ignorant of the secrets of fate; and they returned him a very prudent answer, which might adapt itself to the event, and
secure their reputation, whatever should be the chance of arms.
64 vv
Footnote 60: Literas calamitatum suarum indices supprimebat. Panegyr Vet. ix. 15.
Footnote 61: Remedia malorum potius quam mala differebat, is the fine censure which Tacitus passes on the supine indolence
of Vitellius.
Footnote 62: The Marquis Maffei has made it extremely probable that Constantine was still at Verona, the 1st of
September, A.D. 312, and that the memorable aera of the indications was dated from his conquest of the Cisalpine Gaul.
Footnote 63: See Panegyr. Vet. xi. 16. Lactantius de M. P. c. 44.
Footnote 64: Illo die hostem Romanorum esse periturum.
The vanquished became of course the enemy of Rome.
The
celerity of Constantine's march has been compared to the rapid conquest of Italy by the first of the Caesars; nor is the
flattering parallel repugnant to the truth of history, since no more than fifty-eight days elapsed between the surrender of Verona
and the final decision of the war.
Constantine had always apprehended that the tyrant would consult the dictates of fear, and
perhaps of prudence; and that, instead of risking his last hopes in a general engagement, he would shut himself up within the
walls of Rome. His ample magazines secured him against the danger of famine; and as the situation of Constantine admitted not
of delay, he might have been reduced to the sad necessity of destroying with fire and sword the Imperial city, the noblest
reward of his victory, and the deliverance of which had been the motive, or rather indeed the
pretence, of the civil war.
65 It
was with equal surprise and pleasure, that on his arrival at a place called
Saxa Rubra, about nine miles from Rome,
66v he
discovered the army of Maxentius prepared to give him battle.
67 Their long front filled a very spacious plain, and their deep
array reached to the banks of the
Tiber, which covered their rear, and forbade their retreat. We are informed, and we may
believe, that Constantine disposed his troops with consummate skill, and that he chose for himself the post of honor and danger.
Distinguished by the splendor of his arms, he charged in person the cavalry of his rival; and his irresistible attack determined the
fortune of the day. The cavalry of
Maxentius was principally composed either of unwieldy
cuirassiers, or of light Moors and
Numidians. They yielded to the vigor of the Gallic horse, which possessed more activity than the one, more firmness than the
other. The defeat of the two wings left the infantry without any protection on its flanks, and the undisciplined Italians fled without
reluctance from the standard of a tyrant whom they had always hated, and whom they no longer feared. The Praetorians,
conscious that their offences were beyond the reach of mercy, were animated by revenge and despair. Notwithstanding their
repeated efforts, those brave veterans were unable to recover the victory: they obtained, however, an honorable death; and it
was observed that their bodies covered the same ground which had been occupied by their ranks.
68 The confusion then
became general, and the dismayed troops of Maxentius, pursued by an implacable enemy, rushed by thousands into the deep
and rapid stream of the Tyber. The emperor himself attempted to escape back into the city over the
Milvian bridge; but the
crowds which pressed together through that narrow passage forced him into the river, where he was immediately drowned by
the weight of his armor.
69 His body, which had sunk very deep into the mud, was found with some difficulty the next day.
The sight of his head, when it was exposed to the eyes of the people, convinced them of their deliverance, and admonished
them to receive with acclamations of loyalty and gratitude the fortunate Constantine, who thus achieved by his valor and ability
the most splendid enterprise of his life.
70
Footnote 65: See Panegyr. Vet. ix. 16, x. 27. The former of these orators magnifies the hoards of corn, which Maxentius had
collected from Africa and the Islands. And yet, if there is any truth in the scarcity mentioned by Eusebius, (in Vit. Constantin. l.
i. c. 36,) the Imperial granaries must have been open only to the soldiers.
Footnote 66: Maxentius . . . tandem urbe in Saxa Rubra, millia ferme novem aegerrime progressus. Aurelius Victor. See
Cellarius Geograph. Antiq. tom. i. p. 463. Saxa Rubra was in the neighborhood of the Cremera, a trifling rivulet, illustrated by
the valor and glorious death of the three hundred Fabii.
Footnote 67: The post which Maxentius had taken, with the Tyber in his rear is very clearly described by the two Panegyrists,
ix. 16, x. 28.
Footnote 68: Exceptis latrocinii illius primis auctoribus, qui desperata venia ocum quem pugnae sumpserant
texere corporibus. Panegyr. Vet 17.
Footnote 69: A very idle rumor soon prevailed, that Maxentius, who had not taken any
precaution for his own retreat, had contrived a very artful snare to destroy the army of the pursuers; but that the wooden
bridge, which was to have been loosened on the approach of Constantine, unluckily broke down under the weight of the flying
Italians.
Footnote 70: Zosimus, l. ii. p. 86-88, and the two Panegyrics, the former of which was pronounced a few months afterwards,
afford the clearest notion of this great battle. Lactantius, Eusebius, and even the Epitomes, supply several useful hints.
In the use of victory, Constantine neither deserved the praise of
clemency, nor incurred the censure of immoderate rigor.
71
He inflicted the same treatment to which a defeat would have exposed his own person and family, put to death the two sons of
the tyrant, and carefully extirpated his whole race. The most distinguished adherents of Maxentius must have expected to share
his fate, as they had shared his prosperity and his crimes; but when
the Roman people loudly demanded a greater number of
victims, the
conqueror resisted with firmness and humanity, those servile clamors, which were dictated by flattery as well as by
resentment. Informers were punished and discouraged; the innocent, who had suffered under the late tyranny, were recalled
from
exile, and restored to their estates. A general act of oblivion quieted the minds and settled the property of the people, both
in Italy and in Africa.
72 The first time that Constantine honored the senate with his presence, he recapitulated his own
services and exploits in a modest oration, assured that illustrious order of his sincere regard, and promised to reestablish its
ancient
dignity and privileges. The grateful senate repaid these unmeaning professions by the empty titles of honor, which it was
yet in their power to bestow; and without presuming to ratify the authority of Constantine, they passed a decree to assign him
the first rank among the three Augusti who governed the Roman world.
73 Games and festivals were instituted to preserve the
fame of his victory, and several edifices, raised at the expense of Maxentius, were dedicated to the honor of his successful rival.
The triumphal arch of Constantine still remains a melancholy proof of the decline of the arts, and a singular testimony of the
meanest vanity. As it was not possible to find in the capital of the empire a sculptor who was capable of adorning that public
monument, the
arch of Trajan, without any respect either for his memory or for the rules of propriety, was stripped of its most
elegant figures. The difference of times and persons, of actions and characters, was totally disregarded. The Parthian captives
appear prostrate at the feet of a prince who never carried his arms beyond the
Euphrates; and curious antiquarians can still
discover the head of Trajan on the trophies of Constantine. The new ornaments which it was necessary to introduce between
the vacancies of ancient sculpture are executed in the rudest and most unskillful manner.
74
Footnote 71: Zosimus, the enemy of Constantine, allows (l. ii. p. 88) that only a few of the friends of Maxentius were put to
death; but we may remark the expressive passage of Nazarius, (Panegyr. Vet. x. 6.) Omnibus qui labefactari statum ejus
poterant cum stirpe deletis. The other orator (Panegyr. Vet. ix. 20, 21) contents himself with observing, that Constantine, when
he entered Rome, did not imitate the cruel massacres of Cinna, of Marius, or of Sylla.
Note: This may refer to the son or sons of Maxentius. - M.
Footnote 72: See the two Panegyrics, and the laws of this and the
ensuing year, in the Theodosian Code.
Footnote 73: Panegyr. Vet. ix. 20. Lactantius de M. P. c. 44. Maximin, who was confessedly the eldest Caesar, claimed, with
some show of reason, the first rank among the Augusti.
Footnote 74: Adhuc cuncta opera quae magnifice construxerat, urbis fanum atque basilicam, Flavii meritis patres sacravere.
Aurelius Victor. With regard to the theft of Trajan's trophies, consult Flaminius Vacca, apud Montfaucon, Diarium Italicum, p.
250, and l'Antiquite Expliquee of the latter, tom. iv. p. 171.
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To cite original text:
Gibbon, Edward, 1737-1794.
The history of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire. 1st ed. (London : Printed for W. Strahan ; and T. Cadell, 1776-1788.), pp. 423-430.