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Lawrence v. Texas: an Analysis (idea)
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(
idea
)
by
Sylvar
Thu Jun 26 2003 at 23:13:19
My comments on the case:
Thanks to the
CIPA
decision,
library
patrons would need to ask permission from a library staff member in order to read this important bit of news (unless the library wasn't receiving
e-rate
or
LSTA
money, which most do).
I think I just scored 2
20
geek points for finding a typo in the summary on
supremecourtus.gov
. ("Although the laws involved in
Bowers
and here purport to do not more than prohibit a particular sexual act...": replace "do not more" with "do no more".)
My favorite sentence of
the actual decision
: "This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects." This, along with other parts of the decision, implies that all laws prohibiting private
consensual
sexual acts may be
unconstitutional
. Hooray for
blowjobs
!
The decision explains that while
stare decisis
(loosely, "go with
precedent
") is a very important principle, it is especially important when society has come to rely on the previous decision -- and that society has generally not come to rely firmly upon the former right of states to prohibit sodomy. They therefore explain that it is permissible in this instance, though generally a
Bad Thing
, to contradict previous rulings.
The decision lists reasons that might give
Texas
the right to punish people for sexual acts: minors, fuzzy consent, public acts, prostitution, or whether the government was being asked to give "formal recognition" to a status or act, such as
marriage
. It also explains that none of these topics were germane to this case.
O'Connor concurred only because Texas prohibited homosexual sodomy but not heterosexual sodomy. She maintained that states should be allowed to prohibit sodomy across the board.
Scalia's dissent complains that the court has not consistently applied rules of precedent if they would stand in the way of the justices' opinions about how the case should be decided. He seems to still be bitter about
the Planned Parenthood case
that used the
Roe v. Wade
precedent as a fundamental reason for upholding individual sexual freedom. He also argues that because
Bowers
has been used as a precedent in many cases permitting employers to make decisions based on sexual behavior, for instance allowing deeper investigations when granting
security clearance
s to
queer
people, society must therefore rely on
Bowers
too much for the Supreme Court to overrule it.
Scalia says that society does have a legitimate interest "in protecting
order
and
morality
" which must be weighed against individual sexual liberty, but he cites a public indecency case. In my opinion, public order is not generally threatened by private consensual sexual acts. (It might be threatened by their
absence
, as in
Lysistrata
, but that's another matter.)
Thomas, quoting Stewart in another case, calls the Texas law "
uncommonly silly
" and says he'd vote to repeal it, but he's not a Texas legislator and he doesn't recognize a Constitutional
right to privacy
, so he joins the dissent.
Lawrence v. Texas
Bowers v. Hardwick
Lysistrata
Jesus was a Gay Black Hippie Jew
The New Federalism
You have the right to remain silent
Bush v. Gore
stare decisis
Gay rights in 2004 and beyond
Eisenstadt v. Baird
Antonin Scalia
Loving v. Virginia
Dittohead
Right to privacy
Miranda v. Arizona
Miscegenation
Substantive due process
Roe v. Wade
United States Supreme Court
sodomy