Um, yeah. So, like, these faculties, like, your synthetic judgements of your analytic principles -- narrowly ("broadly") speaking -- are, like, right there, man.

So, the thing is, things in themselves are not in the indefinite sense of "self" (or "not-self") self-sensing, or to put it another way, the sense of the sense of self is not the sense of self, but rather the sense of a sense, or as you might say an anti-sense. This is all very sensible, but the "self" (or "self" to the naïve) has a quality of "selfhood" which implies the non-being ("being") of the "self", if you catch my drift. Right? The concept of the sense of self-sensing conceptual selves, or "selves", is itself a self-sensing concept, or, conceptually speaking, a self-conceptualizing sense of conceptual "selfness" (or "selfness", broadly ("narrowly") speaking).

From this we can see that a syncretic understanding of the being or non-being of any given "being" is ("is") not in and of itself a self, but rather a "self", or non-self, the being being not "being" but rather being a "being" in the "sense" that its faculties ("senses") are either synthetic in themselves or in themselves "synthetic", or in a Heideggerian sense a manifold "nothing" in the sense of the thing that the thing "is not" (which is to say, "is").

I hope I've brought some clarity to the matter.