Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher
February,
1844
Introduction
For Germany, the criticism of religion has been essentially completed, and
the criticism of religion is the prerequisite of all criticism.
The profane existence of error is compromised as soon as its heavenly oratio
pro aris et focis "speech for the altars and hearths" has been refuted. Man,
who has found only the reflection of himself in the fantastic reality of heaven,
where he sought a superman, will no longer feel disposed to find the mere
appearance of himself, the non-man "Unmensch", where he seeks and must seek
his true reality.
The foundation of irreligious criticism is: Man makes religion, religion does
not make man.
Religion is, indeed, the self-consciousness and self-esteem of man who has
either not yet won through to himself, or has already lost himself again. But,
_man_ is no abstract being squatting outside the world. Man is _the world of
man_ -- state, society. This state and this society produce religion, which is
an inverted consciousness of the world, because they are an inverted world.
Religion is the general theory of this world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its
logic in popular form, its spiritual point d'honneur, it enthusiasm, its moral
sanction, its solemn complement, and its universal basis of consolation and
justification. It is the fantastic realization of the human essence since the
human essence has not acquired any true reality. The struggle against religion
is, therefore, indirectly the struggle against that world whose spiritual aroma
is religion.
Religious suffering is, at one and the same time, the expression of real
suffering and a protest against real suffering. Religion is the sigh of the
oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless
conditions. It is the opium of the people.
The abolition of religion as the _illusory_ happiness of the people is the
demand for their _real_ happiness. To call on them to give up their illusions
about their condition is to call on them to give up a condition that requires
illusions. The criticism of religion is, therefore, in embryo, the criticism of
that vale of tears of which religion is the halo.
Criticism has plucked the imaginary flowers on the chain not in order that
man shall continue to bear that chain without fantasy or consolation, but so
that he shall throw off the chain and pluck the living flower. The criticism of
religion disillusions man, so that he will think, act, and fashion his reality
like a man who has discarded his illusions and regained his senses, so that he
will move around himself as his own true Sun. Religion is only the illusory Sun
which revolves around man as long as he does not revolve around himself.
It is, therefore, the task of history, once the other-world of truth has
vanished, to establish the truth of this world. It is the immediate task of
philosophy, which is in the service of history, to unmask self-estrangement in
its unholy forms once the holy form of human self-estrangement has been
unmasked. Thus, the criticism of Heaven turns into the criticism of Earth, the
criticism of religion into the criticism of law, and the criticism of theology
into the criticism of politics.
The following exposition (a full-scale critical study of Hegel's _Philosophy
of Right_ was supposed to follow this introduction) -- a contribution to this
undertaking -- concerns itself not directly with the original but with a copy,
with the German philosophy of the state and of law. The only reason for this
is that it is concerned with Germany.
If we were to begin with the German status quo itself, the result -- even if
we were to do it in the only appropriate way, i.e., negatively -- would still be
an anachronism. Even the negation of our present political situation is a dusty
fact in the historical junk room of modern nations. If I negate the situation in
Germany in 1843, then according to the French calendar I have barely reached
1789, much less the vital centre of our present age.
Indeed, German history prides itself on having travelled a road which no
other nation in the whole of history has ever travelled before, or ever will
again. We have shared the restorations of modern nations without ever having
shared their revolutions. We have been restored, firstly, because other nations
dared to make revolutions, and, secondly, because other nations suffered
counter-revolutions; open the one hand, because our masters were afraid, and, on
the other, because they were not afraid. With our shepherds to the fore, we only
once kept company with freedom, on the day of its internment.
One school of thought that legitimizes the infamy of today with the infamy of
yesterday, a school that stigmatizes every cry of the serf against the knout as
mere rebelliousness once the knout has aged a little and acquired a hereditary
significance and a history, a school to which history shows nothing but its a
posteriori, as did the God of Israel to his servant Moses, the historical school
of law -- this school would have invented German history were it not itself an
invention of that history. A Shylock, but a cringing Shylock, that swears by its
bond, its historical bond, its Christian-Germanic bond, for every pound of flesh
cut from the heart of the people.
Good-natured enthusiasts, Germanomaniacs by extraction and free-thinkers by
reflexion, on the contrary, seek our history of freedom beyond our history in
the ancient Teutonic forests. But, what difference is there between the history
of our freedom and the history of the boar's freedom if it can be found only in
the forests? Besides, it is common knowledge that the forest echoes back what
you shout into it. So peace to the ancient Teutonic forests!
War on the German state of affairs! By all means! They are below the level of
history, they are beneath any criticism, but they are still an object of
criticism like the criminal who is below the level of humanity but still an
object for the executioner. In the struggle against that state of affairs,
criticism is no passion of the head, it is the head of passion. It is not a
lancet, it is a weapon. Its object is its enemy, which it wants not to refute
but to exterminate. For the spirit of that state of affairs is refuted. In
itself, it is no object worthy of thought, it is an existence which is as
despicable as it is despised. Criticism does not need to make things clear to
itself as regards this object, for it has already settled accounts with it. It
no longer assumes the quality of an end-in-itself, but only of a means. Its
essential pathos is indignation, its essential work is denunciation.
It is a case of describing the dull reciprocal pressure of all social spheres
one on another, a general inactive ill-humor, a limitedness which recognizes
itself as much as it mistakes itself, within the frame of government system
which, living on the preservation of all wretchedness, is itself nothing but
wretchedness in office.
What a sight! This infinitely proceeding division of society into the most
manifold races opposed to one another by petty antipathies, uneasy consciences,
and brutal mediocrity, and which, precisely because of their reciprocal
ambiguous and distrustful attitude, are all, without exception although with
various formalities, treated by their rulers as conceded existences. And they
must recognize and acknowledge as a concession of heaven the very fact that they
are mastered, ruled, possessed! And, on the other side, are the rulers
themselves, whose greatness is in inverse proportion to their number!
Criticism dealing with this content is criticism in a hand-to-hand fight, and
in such a fight the point is not whether the opponent is a noble, equal,
interesting opponent, the point is to _strike_ him. The point is not to let the
Germans have a minute for self-deception and resignation. The actual pressure
must be made more pressing by adding to it consciousness of pressure, the shame
must be made more shameful by publicizing it. Every sphere of German society
must be shown as the partie honteuse of German society: these petrified
relations must be forced to dance by singing their own tune to them! The people
must be taught to be _terrified_ at itself in order to give it _courage_. This
will be fulfilling an imperative need of the German nation, and the needs of the
nations are in themselves the ultimate reason for their satisfaction.
This struggle against the limited content of the German status quo cannot be
without interest even for the modern nations, for the German status quo is the
open completion of the ancien regime and the ancien regime is the concealed
deficiency of the modern state. The struggle against the German political
present is the struggle against the past of the modern nations, and they are
still burdened with reminders of that past. It is instructive for them to see
the ancien regime, which has been through its tragedy with them, playing its
comedy as a German revenant. Tragic indeed was the pre-existing power of the
world, and freedom, on the other hand, was a personal notion; in short, as long
as it believed and had to believe in its own justification. As long as the
ancien regime, as an existing world order, struggled against a world that was
only coming into being, there was on its side a historical error, not a personal
one. That is why its downfall was tragic.
On the other hand, the present German regime, an anachronism, a flagrant
contradiction of generally recognized axioms, the nothingness of the ancien
regime exhibited to the world, only imagines that it believes in itself and
demands that the world should imagine the same thing. If it believed in its own
essence, would it try to hide that essence under the semblance of an alien
essence and seek refuge in hypocrisy and 8sophism]? The modern ancien regime is
rather only the comedian of a world order whose _true heroes_ are dead. History
is thorough and goes through many phases when carrying an old form to the grave.
The last phases of a world-historical form is its comedy. The gods of Greece,
already tragically wounded to death in Aeschylus's tragedy Prometheus Bound,
had to re-die a comic death in Lucian's Dialogues. Why this course of history?
So that humanity should part with its past cheerfully. This cheerful historical
destiny is what we vindicate for the political authorities of Germany.
Meanwhile, once _modern_ politico-social reality itself is subjected to
criticism, once criticism rises to truly human problems, it finds itself outside
the German status quo, or else it would reach out for its object _below_ its
object. An example. The relation of industry, of the world of wealth generally,
to the political world is one of the major problems of modern times. In what
form is this problem beginning to engage the attention of the Germans? In the
form of protective duties, of the prohibitive system, or national economy.
Germanomania has passed out of man into matter,, and thus one morning our cotton
barons and iron heroes saw themselves turned into patriots. People are,
therefore, beginning in Germany to acknowledge the sovereignty of monopoly on
the inside through lending it sovereignty on the outside. People are,
therefore, now about to begin, in Germany, what people in France and England are
about to end. The old corrupt condition against which these countries are
revolting in theory, and which they only bear as one bears chains, is greeted in
Germany as the dawn of a beautiful future which still hardly dares to pass from
_crafty_ theory to the most ruthless practice. Whereas the problem in France and
England is: Political economy, or the rule of society over wealth; in Germany,
it is: National economy, or the mastery of private property over nationality. In
France and England, then, it is a case of abolishing monopoly that has proceeded
to its last consequences; in Germany, it is a case of proceeding to the last
consequences of monopoly. There is an adequate example of the _German_ form of
modern problems, an example of how our history, like a clumsy recruit, still has
to do extra drill on things that are old and hackneyed in history.
If, therefore, the _whole_ German development did not exceed the German
political development, a German could at the most have the share in the
problems-of-the-present that a Russian has. But, when the separate individual is
not bound by the limitations of the nation, the nation as a whole is still less
liberated by the liberation of one individual. The fact that Greece had a
Scythian among its philosophers did not help the Scythians to make a single step
towards Greek culture. An allusion to Anacharsis.
Luckily, we Germans are not Scythians.
As the ancient peoples went through their pre-history in imagination, in
_mythology_, so we Germans have gone through our post-history in thought, in
_philosophy_. We are philosophical contemporaries of the present without being
its historical contemporaries. German philosophy is the _ideal prolongation_ of
German history. If therefore, instead of of the oeuvres incompletes of our real
history, we criticize the oeuvres posthumes of our ideal history, philosophy,
our criticism is in the midst of the questions of which the present says: that
is the question. What, in progressive nations, is a practical break with modern
state conditions, is, in Germany, where even those conditions do not yet exist,
at first a critical break with the philosophical reflexion of those conditions.
German philosophy of right and state is the only _German history_ which is al
pari "on a level" with the _official_ modern present. The German nation must
therefore join this, its dream-history, to its present conditions and subject to
criticism not only these existing conditions, but at the same time their
abstract continuation. Its future cannot be limited either to the immediate
negation of its real conditions of state and right, or to the immediate
implementation of its ideal state and right conditions, for it has the immediate
negation of its real conditions in its ideal conditions, and it has almost
outlived the immediate implementation of its ideal conditions in the
contemplation of neighboring nations.
Hence, it is with good reason that the _practical_ political part in Germany
demands the _negation of philosophy_.
It is wrong, not in its demand but in stopping at the demand, which it
neither seriously implements nor can implement. It believes that it implements
that negation by turning its back to philosophy and its head away from it and
muttering a few trite and angry phrases about it. Owing to the limitation of its
outlook, it does not include philosophy in the circle of _German_ reality or it
even fancies it is _beneath_ German practice and the theories that serve it. You
demand that real life embryos be made the starting-point, but you forget that
the real life embryo of the German nation has grown so far only inside its
_cranium_. In a word -- You cannot abolish philosophy without making it a
reality.
The same mistake, but with the factors reversed, was made by the
_theoretical_ party originating from philosophy.
In the present struggle it saw only the critical struggle of philosophy
against the German world; it did not give a thought to the fact that philosophy
up to the present itself belongs to this world and is its completion, although
an ideal one. Critical towards its counterpart, it was uncritical towards itself
when, proceeding from the premises of philosophy, it either stopped at the
results given by philosophy or passed off demands and results from somewhere
else as immediate demands and results of philosophy -- although these, provided
they are justified, can be obtained only by the negation of philosophy up to the
present, of philosophy as such. We reserve ourselves the right to a more
detailed description of this section: It thought it could make philosophy a
reality without abolishing it.
The criticism of the German philosophy of state and right, which attained its
most consistent, richest, and last formulation through Hegel, is both a critical
analysis of the modern state and of the reality connected with it, and the
resolute negation of the whole manner of the German consciousness in politics
and right as practiced hereto, the most distinguished, most universal expression
of which, raised to the level of science, is the speculative philosophy of right
itself. If the speculative philosophy of right, that abstract extravagant
thinking on the modern state, the reality of which remains a thing of the
beyond, if only beyond the Rhine, was possible only in Germany, inversely the
German thought-image of the modern state which makes abstraction of _real man_
was possible only because and insofar as the modern state itself makes
abstraction of _real man_, or satisfies the whole of man only in imagination. In
politics, the Germans _thought_ what other nations _did_. Germany was their
theoretical conscience. The abstraction and presumption of its thought was
always in step with the one-sidedness and lowliness of its reality. If,
therefore, the status quo of German statehood expresses the completion of the
ancien regime, the completion of the thorn in the flesh of the modern state, the
status quo of German state science expresses the incompletion of the modern
state, the defectiveness of its flesh itself.
Already as the resolute opponent of the previous form of German political
consciousness the criticism of speculative philosophy of right strays, not into
itself, but into problems which there is only one means of solving -- practice.
It is asked: can Germany attain a practice a la hauteur des principles --
i.e., a revolution which will raises it not only to the _official level_ of
modern nations, but to the _height of humanity_ which will be the near future of
those nations?
The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism of the weapon,
material force must be overthrown by material force; but theory also becomes a
material force as soon as it has gripped the masses. Theory is capable of
gripping the masses as soon as it demonstrates ad hominem, and it demonstrates
ad hominem as soon as it becomes radical. To be radical is to grasp the root of
the matter. But, for man, the root is man himself. The evident proof of the
radicalism of German theory, and hence of its practical energy, is that is
proceeds from a resolute positive abolition of religion. The criticism of
religion ends with the teaching that man is the highest essence for man --
hence, with the categoric imperative to overthrow all relations in which man is
a debased, enslaved, abandoned, despicable essence, relations which cannot be
better described than by the cry of a Frenchman when it was planned to introduce
a tax on dogs: Poor dogs! They want to treat you as human beings!
Even historically, theoretical emancipation has specific practical
significance for Germany. For Germany's revolutionary past is theoretical, it is
the Reformation. As the revolution then began in the brain of the monk, so now
it begins in the brain of the philosopher.
Luther, we grant, overcame bondage out of devotion by replacing it by bondage
out of conviction. He shattered faith in authority because he restored the
authority of faith. He turned priests into laymen because he turned laymen into
priests. He freed man from outer religiosity because he made religiosity the
inner man. He freed the body from chains because he enchained the heart.
But, if Protestantism was not the true solution of the problem, it was at
least the true setting of it. It was no longer a case of the layman's struggle
against the priest _outside_ himself but of his struggle against his own priest
_inside_ himself, his priestly nature. And if the Protestant transformation of
the German layman into priests emancipated the lay popes, the princes, with the
whole of their priestly clique, the privileged and philistines, the
philosophical transformation of priestly Germans into men will emancipate the
people. But, secularization will not stop at the confiscation of church estates
set in motion mainly by hypocritical Prussia any more than emancipation stops at
princes. The Peasant War, the most radical fact of German history, came to grief
because of theology. Today, when theology itself has come to grief, the most
unfree fact of German history, our status quo, will be shattered against
philosophy. On the eve of the Reformation, official Germany was the most
unconditional slave of Rome. On the eve of its revolution, it is the
unconditional slave of less than Rome, of Prussia and Austria, of country
junkers and philistines.
Meanwhile, a major difficult seems to stand in the way of a _radical_ German
revolution.
For revolutions require a passive element, a material basis. Theory is
fulfilled in a people only insofar as it is the fulfilment of the needs of that
people. But will the monstrous discrepancy between the demands of German thought
and the answers of German reality find a corresponding discrepancy between civil
society and the state, and between civil society and itself? Will the
theoretical needs be immediate practical needs? It is not enough for thought to
strive for realization, reality must itself strive towards thought.
But Germany did not rise to the intermediary stage of political emancipation
at the same time as the modern nations. It has not yet reached in practice the
stages which it has surpassed in theory. How can it do a somersault, not only
over its own limitations, but at the same time over the limitations of the
modern nations, over limitations which it must in reality feel and strive for as
for emancipation from its real limitations? Only a revolution of radical needs
can be a radical revolution and it seems that precisely the preconditions and
ground for such needs are lacking.
If Germany has accompanied the development of the modern nations only with
the abstract activity of thought without taking an effective share in the real
struggle of that development, it has, on the other hand, shared the sufferings
of that development, without sharing in its enjoyment, or its partial
satisfaction. To the abstract activity on the one hand corresponds the abstract
suffering on the other. That is why Germany will one day find itself on the
level of European decadence before ever having been on the level of European
emancipation. It will be comparable to a fetish worshipper pining away with the
diseases of Christianity.
If we now consider the German governments, we find that because of the
circumstances of the time, because of Germany's condition, because of the
standpoint of German education, and, finally, under the impulse of its own
fortunate instinct, they are driven to combine the civilized shortcomings of the
modern state world, the advantages of which we do not enjoy, with the barbaric
deficiencies of the ancien regime, which we enjoy in full; hence, Germany must
share more and more, if not in the reasonableness, at least in the
unreasonableness of those state formations which are beyond the bounds of its
status quo. Is there in the world, for example, a country which shares so
naively in all the illusions of constitutional statehood without sharing in its
realities as so-called constitutional Germany? And was it not perforce the
notion of a German government to combine the tortures of censorship with the
tortures of the French September laws 1835 anti-press laws which provide for
freedom of the press? As you could find the gods of all nations in the Roman
Pantheon, so you will find in the Germans' Holy Roman Empire all the sins of all
state forms. That this eclecticism will reach a so far unprecedented height is
guaranteed in particular by the political-aesthetic gourmanderie of a German
king Frederick William IV who intended to play all the roles of monarchy,
whether feudal or democratic, if not in the person of the people, at least in
his own person, and if not for the people, at least for himself. Germany, as the
deficiency of the political present constituted a world of its own, will not be
able to throw down the specific German limitations without throwing down the
general limitation of the political present.
It is not the radical revolution, not the general human emancipation which is
a utopian dream for Germany, but rather the partial, the merely political
revolution, the revolution which leaves the pillars of the house standing. On
what is a partial, a merely political revolution based? On part of civil society
emancipating itself and attaining general domination; on a definite class,
proceeding from its particular situation; undertaking the general emancipation
of society. This class emancipates the whole of society, but only provided the
whole of society is in the same situation as this class -- e.g., possesses money
and education or can acquire them at will.
No class of civil society can play this role without arousing a moment of
enthusiasm in itself and in the masses, a moment in which it fraternizes and
merges with society in general, becomes confused with it and is perceived and
acknowledged as its general representative, a moment in which its claims and
rights are truly the claims and rights of society itself, a moment in which it
is truly the social head and the social heart. Only in the name of the general
rights of society can a particular class vindicate for itself general
domination. For the storming of this emancipatory position, and hence for the
political exploitation of all sections of society in the interests of its own
section, revolutionary energy and spiritual self-feeling alone are not
sufficient. For the revolution of a nation, and the emancipation of a particular
class of civil society to coincide, for one estate to be acknowledged as the
estate of the whole society, all the defects of society must conversely be
concentrated in another class, a particular estate must be the estate of the
general stumbling-block, the incorporation of the general limitation, a
particular social sphere must be recognized as the notorious crime of the whole
of society, so that liberation from that sphere appears as general
self-liberation. For one estate to be par excellence the estate of liberation,
another estate must conversely be the obvious estate of oppression. The negative
general significance of the French nobility and the French clergy determined the
positive general significance of the nearest neighboring and opposed class of
the bourgeoisie.
But no particular class in Germany has the constituency, the penetration, the
courage, or the ruthlessness that could mark it out as the negative
representative of society. No more has any estate the breadth of soul that
identifies itself, even for a moment, with the soul of the nation, the geniality
that inspires material might to political violence, or that revolutionary daring
which flings at the adversary the defiant words: I am nothing but I must be
everything. The main stem of German morals and honesty, of the classes as well
as of individuals, is rather that modest egoism which asserts it limitedness and
allows it to be asserted against itself. The relation of the various sections of
German society is therefore not dramatic but epic. Each of them begins to be
aware of itself and begins to camp beside the others with all its particular
claims not as soon as it is oppressed, but as soon as the circumstances of the
time relations, without the section's own participation, creates a social
substratum on which it can in turn exert pressure. Even the moral self-feeling
of the German middle class rests only on the consciousness that it is the common
representative of the philistine mediocrity of all the other classes. It is
therefore not only the German kinds who accede to the throne mal a propos, it is
every section of civil society which goes through a defeat before it celebrates
victory and develops its own limitations before it overcomes the limitations
facing it, asserts its narrow-hearted essence before it has been able to assert
its magnanimous essence; thus the very opportunity of a great role has passed
away before it is to hand, and every class, once it begins the struggle against
the class opposed to it, is involved in the struggle against the class below it.
Hence, the higher nobility is struggling against the monarchy, the bureaucrat
against the nobility, and the bourgeois against them all, while the proletariat
is already beginning to find itself struggling against the bourgeoisie. The
middle class hardly dares to grasp the thought of emancipation from its own
standpoint when the development of the social conditions and the progress of
political theory already declare that standpoint antiquated or at least
problematic.
In France, it is enough for somebody to be something for him to want to be
everything; in Germany, nobody can be anything if he is not prepared to renounce
everything. In France, partial emancipation is the basis of universal
emancipation; in Germany, universal emancipation is the conditio sine qua non of
any partial emancipation. In France, it is the reality of gradual liberation
that must give birth to complete freedom, in Germany, the impossibility of
gradual liberation. In France, every class of the nation is a _political
idealist_ and becomes aware of itself at first not as a particular class but as
a representative of social requirements generally. The role of emancipator
therefore passes in dramatic motion to the various classes of the French nation
one after the other until it finally comes to the class which implements social
freedom no longer with the provision of certain conditions lying outside man and
yet created by human society, but rather organizes all conditions of human
existence on the premises of social freedom. On the contrary, in Germany, where
practical life is as spiritless as spiritual life is unpractical, no class in
civil society has any need or capacity for general emancipation until it is
forced by its immediate condition, by material necessity, by its very chains.
Where, then, is the _positive_ possibility of a German emancipation?
Answer: In the formulation of a class with _radical chains_, a class of civil
society which is not a class of civil society, an estate which is the
dissolution of all estates, a sphere which has a universal character by its
universal suffering and claims no particular right because no particular wrong,
but wrong generally, is perpetuated against it; which can invoke no historical,
but only human, title; which does not stand in any one-sided antithesis to the
consequences but in all-round antithesis to the premises of German statehood; a
sphere, finally, which cannot emancipate itself without emancipating itself from
all other spheres of society and thereby emancipating all other spheres of
society, which, in a word, is the complete loss of man and hence can win itself
only through the complete re-winning of man. This dissolution of society as a
particular estate is the proletariat.
The proletariat is beginning to appear in Germany as a result of the rising
industrial movement. For, it is not the naturally arising poor but the
artificially impoverished, not the human masses mechanically oppressed by the
gravity of society, but the masses resulting from the drastic dissolution of
society, mainly of the middle estate, that form the proletariat, although, as is
easily understood, the naturally arising poor and the Christian-Germanic serfs
gradually join its ranks.
By heralding the dissolution of the hereto existing world order, the
proletariat merely proclaims the secret of its own existence, for it is the
factual dissolution of that world order. By demanding the negation of private
property, the proletariat merely raises to the rank of a principle of society
what society has raised to the rank of _its_ principle, what is already
incorporated in _it_ as the negative result of society without its own
participation. The proletarian then finds himself possessing the same right in
regard to the world which is coming into being as the German king in regard to
the world which has come into being when he calls the people _his_people, as he
calls the horse _his_ horse. By declaring the people his private property, the
king merely proclaims that the private owner is king.
As philosophy finds its material weapon in the proletariat, so the
proletariat finds its _spiritual_ weapon in philosophy. And once the lightning
of thought has squarely struck this ingenuous soil of the people, the
emancipation of the Germans into men will be accomplished.
Let us sum up the result:
The only liberation of Germany which is _practically_ possible is liberation
from the point of view of _that_ theory which declares man to be the supreme
being for man. German can emancipate itself from the Middle Ages only if it
emancipates itself at the same time from the _partial_ victories over the Middle
Ages. In Germany, no form of bondage can be broken without breaking _all_ forms
of bondage. Germany, which is renowned for its thoroughness, cannot make a
revolution unless it is a thorough one. The emancipation of the German is the
emancipation of man. The head of this emancipation is philosophy, its heart the
proletariat. Philosophy cannot realize itself without the transcendence
Aufhebung of the proletariat, and the proletariat cannot transcend itself
without the realization Verwirklichung of philosophy.
When all the inner conditions are met, the day of the German resurrection
will be heralded by the crowing of the cock of Gaul.