This is a strategy based upon the object of denying ability to your opponent.

It has been a long time since I studied this, but I recall it being most frequently identifiable in a historical discussion of United States nuclear weapons doctrine. Through the 70's U.S. policy began to modify their policy of mutually assured destruction(MAD).1. There was at least some concern that the threat of MAD would be inadequate to dissuade the Soviets from attempting a limited nuclear exchange.

The U.S. had to deny options to the Soviets - any perceived window to avoid MAD had to be squashed. The way to do this was to move towards a policy where the U.S. intended to prevail - to make it clear that under any circumstances the Soviets would be punished beyond their ability to recover.

1: There was NSDM 242, in 1974, (been so long I did have to look that one up) and Carter's PD-59, in 1980, (which prompted me to write one of my college papers tying it to the eventual adoption of the conventional strategy of Air-Land Battle by the U.S. military).