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81. Telegram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to Secretary of State Rusk,
at Paris/1/
Belgrade, June 2, 1961, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.61/5-3161. Confidential;
Niact. Also sent to the Department as telegram 981, which is the source text.
66. Washington personal for Acting Secretary. Paris personal for Secretary.
Deptel 830, repeated Paris 5140./2/ Much appreciate
suggestion I send President my views in connection with Vienna meeting but
fear there is little I can say that would be helpful. Am not informed as to
background considerations that led to arrangement of meeting at this time
and am not entirely certain as to underlying expectations and hopes with which
we are approaching it.
/2/Telegram 830, May 31, asked Kennan to send the President his advice, suggestions, and analysis for the meeting with Khrushchev. (Ibid., 611.61/6-261)
I do not share frequently stated view that Khrushchev needs to be personally
assured at this time of our determination to resist any overt encroachment
that would bring into play our obligation under UN or existing alliances.
He is well acquainted with our situation in these respects and knows that
we will not hesitate to react with determination if challenged in this manner.
He does not, I am sure, propose to offer us such challenges, if he can help
it, particularly such as would threaten to embroil us directly with Soviet
forces. Whatever pressures he may be planning to exert on US in Berlin
in coming period, they are not likely to be ones which, in his opinion, would
present us with an overt and clear challenge of this nature.
It would not be useful for me to attempt to enter at this date into discussion
of our positions on those great questions, such as Germany, Berlin, Korea-Japan,
et cetera, in which Russian interests and our own are both normally involved,
which constitute in my view center and source of deepest tensions. On other
hand, I am skeptical of usefulness of any detailed discussion with Khrushchev
of peripheral situations such as Laos, Cuba, and Iran. Soviet responsibility
as a rule is not formally involved in these situations; and where Soviet policies
have contributed to their exacerbation, these have been only one of many factors.
It seems to me evident that decisions of eighty-one parties meeting in Moscow
last fall rested on agreed calculation, as between Russians and Chinese,
that America's world position and influence could probably be effectively
shattered in coming period, and the NATO group politically isolated by series
of sharp indirect political pressures, ruthless exploitation of colonial issue,
and all-out propaganda attack. I think it could usefully be emphasized to
Khrushchev that a political program founded on such calculation is not only
wholly inconsistent with any attempt to improve international atmosphere but
could scarcely be expected to achieve completion without at some point creating
situations where our military obligations would become involved and complications
created beyond anyone's control. It could be justly put to Khrushchev that
inflammatory and insulting language in which recent Soviet statements have
been cast constitutes alone a grievous disservice to any efforts to improve
world situation and plays directly into hands of those who view with disfavor
or despair the prospect of any improvement in Soviet-American relations.
In light of above, it seems to me general tenor of President's approach could
well be that (1) basic political problems dividing us from Russians and
Chinese in European and East-Asian areas, outside of disarmament, are
of such difficulty that much time and patient preparation of public opinion
would be involved before any practical negotiating approach could be made
to their solutions; (2) we would like to start on the long task of cultivating
a suitable atmosphere and climate of opinion in which to tackle these questions;
but (3) it is idle to attempt this in face of the impressions recently created
by violent Russian statements, by obvious attempt to destroy United Nations
Secretariat, and by equally obvious effort to exploit colonial and other
issues with a view to blackening American image before world public, distorting
American action and intentions, and sowing hatred and mistrust of American
people.
Though aware that my views in this respect are at variance with those of
many prominent American students of Soviet scene within and without government,
I have still not seen evidence to convince me that Khrushchev is an absolute
dictator of policy within the Communist orbit or that he does not have to
take into account views of other people and parties. Do not believe that hints
transmitted to us from time to time along this line (most recently to me personally
by Soviet Ambassador here, yesterday) are wholly without substance. I think
Khrushchev has, for various reasons, a greater interest in relaxation of tensions
between Russia and the West than have his Chinese allies; that it was
not without inner hesitations and conflicts that he was led last fall to accept
the aggressive Chinese line on spreading of socialism by means short of all-out
war; and that he could well use some help from outside in arguing for a somewhat
more moderate and prudent course on part of communist parties. For this
reason, I hope his personal position, and possible effects of Vienna talks
on it, will not be left out of our consideration as we plan our approach to
the meeting.
From the particular vantage point of Belgrade, it is evident that noncommitted
world now stand at very crucial parting of the ways. If some relaxation of
over-all world tensions is not achieved, it seems to me very likely that there
will be serious split between that group of unaligned nations which is violently
anti-Western and anti-American and that which would like to preserve decent
relations with the West. This issue may be at stake in forthcoming Cairo
meeting. To extent that Vienna meeting creates impression of improvement
of Soviet-Western relations, Yugoslavia, whose influence together with
that of Nehru/3/ may be decisive in determining
trends within the nonaligned group, will be cautioned against association
with anti-Western tendencies. If, however, no improvement in East-West relations
is achieved at this time, position of Yugoslavia and other neutrals may be
expected to become more difficult; and in this case, as things now stand,
there would be small hope of drawing this country generally to the pro-Western
camp.
/3/Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India.
Kennan
82. Editorial Note
Following his meetings with President de Gaulle in Paris, President
Kennedy arrived in Vienna at 10:45 a.m. on June 3, 1961. After a ceremonial
meeting with Austrian President Schaerf the President and Secretary of State
went to the U.S. Embassy residence for the first meeting with Chairman Khrushchev,
who had arrived in Vienna the previous day. This meeting lasted until 1:30
p.m. when the President hosted a luncheon for the Chairman at the residence.
Following lunch the President again met with Khrushchev, while Rusk and
Foreign Minister Gromyko met separately. These sessions ended shortly before
7 p.m. in order to allow Kennedy and the Chairman to prepare for a State dinner
given by the Austrian Government and attended by the First Ladies. Records
of the two formal meetings, the luncheon discussion, and Rusk's conversation
with Gromyko are printed as Documents 83-86.
On June 4 the President and the Chairman met at the Soviet Chancery
from 10:15 to 1 p.m. during which the President was given aide-memoires on
disarmament and Germany and Berlin. Following lunch at the Soviet Chancery,
Kennedy and Khrushchev met again at 3:15 for about 15 minutes. For records
of the two meetings and the discussion at lunch, see Documents 87-89. At the
conclusion of the meeting Secretary Rusk returned to Paris to brief President
de Gaulle and to report to the North Atlantic Council. The President stopped
in London for a similar briefing of Prime Minister Macmillan, while Assistant
Secretary of State Kohler went to Bonn to brief Chancellor Adenauer.
U.S. memoranda of the conversations between Kennedy and Khrushchev
were drafted by Alexander Akalovsky, the President's interpreter. These records
are presented here. Following each meeting the U.S. delegation also prepared
summaries that were transmitted to Washington. These telegrams are identified
in the footnotes. After the Summit Conference the Bureau of European Affairs
of the Department of State prepared a 47-page "Transcript of the Vienna
Meeting," which closely follows Akalovsky's drafts with minor errors and repetitions
corrected. A copy of this transcript is in Department of State, Central Files,
711.11/KE/6-461.
The only personal record by a participant in all the meetings is Khrushchev's The Last Testament, pages 492-501, and it is incomplete and selective. Ambassador Bohlen, who participated in all but one of the meetings, has also presented a personal account in Witness to History, pages 480-482. The President's Press Secretary, Pierre Salinger, describes some of the conversation at the luncheons in With Kennedy, pages 175-180. Two other accounts based on reading the official records also bear note. Sorensen in Kennedy, pages 543-550, gives details of some aspects of the meetings indicating that he read the memoranda of the conversations, while Beschloss, The Crisis Years, pages 192-224 captures both the essence of the meetings and the atmosphere of the summit conference.
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES - 1961-1963 - Volume V - Soviet Union P38