What does [Jacques Derrida|Derrida] mean by ‘iterability’ in his essay "[Signature, Event, Context]"?

[Iterability] is the possibility of removing a mark from its [context] and placing it in another. [Jacques Derrida|Derrida] believes that iterability is something that fundamentally structures all marks (written, oral or otherwise). Thus, every [grapheme|mark] has the inherent possibility of being ‘cited’, ‘quoted’ or ‘grafted’ (to use [Jacques Derrida|Derrida]’s terms). [Jacques Derrida|Derrida] states that:

…communication must be [repeat]able —[iterable]— in the absolute absence of the receiver or of any determinable collectivity of receievers. Such iterability—(iter, again, probably comes from itara, other in [Sanskrit], and everything that follows can be read as the working out of the logic that ties repetition to [alterity]) [structuralism|structures] the mark of writing itself, no matter what particular type of writing is involved… A [writing] that is not structurally readable—iterable—beyond the death of the addressee would not be writing ([SEC] 7).

So for [Jacques Derrida|Derrida] the possibility of iteration is a (if not the) defining characteristic of any mark. If it is not iterable (repeatable, even in the [radical] absence of any receiver) it is not a written mark.

This is all very well and good, but it doesn't really seem that [problematic] yet. And [Jacques Derrida|Derrida] isn't [Jacques Derrida|Derrida] without some pressing problematic. We discover the problems that this iterability contains when [Jacques Derrida|Derrida] applies it to [John Austin]'s version of [speech act theory], specifically the version exhibited in [John Austin|Austin]'s [How To Do Things With Words].

So just what problems does iterability pose (if any) for [John Austin|Austin]’s [speech act] theory? Well, after taking iterability as an inherent structure or quality of any mark, [Jacques Derrida|Derrida] applies this [structure] to [John Austin|Austin]’s [speech-act theory] and asks:

Could a [performative utterance] succeed if its formulation did not repeat a “[coded]” or iterable utterance, or in other words, if the formula I pronounce in conforming with an iterable model, if it were not then identifiable in some way as a “citation”? ([Signature Event Context|SEC] 18).

Just before the above quotation, [Jacques Derrida|Derrida] has illustrated [John Austin|Austin]’s [exclusion] from his analysis of speech acts precisely the sort of [speech act] that [Jacques Derrida|Derrida] is talking about: those made in plays, in [jest], in poetry, or in fiction (ie: those that are obviously iterated/repeated). What [Jacques Derrida|Derrida] wants to ask us is: does this sort of exclusion ignore (or discount) the very structure of the thing that it sets out to analyze? Or: Does the exclusion of these ‘[parasitic]’ speech acts (which are [cited]/repeated/iterated speech acts) ignore/discount the fact that all marks are fundamentally iterable. Derrida will argue that it does, and that such an exclusion is, for that reason, a [metaphysical] and dangerous one.

Since, unlike my friend [frankdeluxe] above, I've read and own a copy of [How To Do Things With Words] I think that I will do a writeup on its basic principles. Its rather helpful in understanding what [John Austin|Derrida] is getting at with all this. And its also helpful in being critical of [Jacques Derrida|Derrida]'s reading of [John Austin|Austin]...

iterability (idea)