I'll give you some background first. It's titled Epistemology: a contemporary introduction to the theory of knowledge by Robert Audi, second edition. I bought it on Amazon from God knows who for about twenty bucks. The italicized text is from the textbook, and the normal text is a comment on the italicized text. All comments were written small, in pen. Enjoy.
This is in effect to grant foundationalists that they are right about our psychology, while insisting that they are wrong about epistemology.
Granted, the psychiatrists' belief that he was born long after the battle coheres with our beliefs.
! Majority rules; social composition of knowledge.
If someone did not see this, it would probably not help to point out that no proposition is both true and false.
? Being is!
Similarly, if I do not know that I am not simply having a vivid dream in which it seems to me that there is a green field in front of me, can I know that there is one there?
Life is a dream.
It may seem that skepticism offends so blatantly against common sense, and so lopsidedly prefers the ideal of avoiding falsehood over that of believing truths, that it should be dismissed as ridiculous.
Buddhism makes a whole religion out of it.
Truth = probability of association
(this also applies to this statement)
(in response to a paragraph on the problem of induction)
wow... that's cool!
Why, then, could I not be alone in the world, and perhaps even a "brain in a vat," a brain kept alive by a nurturing liquid and subjected to hallucinations that falsely convey the impression of a normal life? We could dub this the envatment problem.
It goes further if it is a total regress but this lame fool doesn't keep going.
Most skeptics have tended to push no further, or at least to express very much doubt about our capacity to know propositions of two specific kinds: those about what is currently going on in our minds and at least those a priori propositions that are luminously self evident.
I go further. Buddhism goes further.
To make this sort of argument work with beliefs of self-evident propositions we must, I think, strain.
Descartes may be read as seriously entertaining the question of whether it is possible that God -
Why is God in this fucking book!
Leaving such skepticism aside takes little from the skeptic in any case.
In appraising skepticism, I want to formulate some of the main principles that underlie it in what seem its most plausible forms. If they can be shown to be unreasonable -
What if you are skeptical of reason!
Knowledge can never have a falsehood as its object.
Can there be false knowledge?
information --> the table is not vs. knowledge --> the table is
Surely I know some propositions that are not necessary, such as that I exist.
This is a fucking shit argument!
(at the top of the page)
You don't know you exist!
Even the skeptic would grant that I cannot falsely believe this, since my believing it entails that I exist.
Right. He would attack further!
(at the bottom of the page)
This is Descartes 1600! We're in 2000 now! Fuck!
Are you a fucking idiot! Go back to school you fucking retard!
A negative defense requires only contending that skepticism provides no good argument against common sense.
There is no argument!
Skeptic, not: There is no knowledge --> What is 'knowledge?'
(Then, you get fucked!)