Why the grue-bleen paradox is not solvable by Occam's Razor:

When I say an emerald is green it explicitly means that it caused a perception of greeness1 in my mind during the period I was observing it. The stone itself may in fact be green (see realism), may be some other colour (see hallucination), may not have a colour (see secondary qualities), or may not actually exist (see idealism).

So in the case of the grue-bleen paradox we must consider the phrase "that emerald is green" to implicitly expand to "that emerald appears green to me now and were I to observe it at any time in the future it would also appear green". This is not significantly less complex than "that emerald appears green to me now; were I to observe it at any time before 2000-01-01 it would also appear green; were I to observe it at any time after 2000-01-01 it would appear blue".

Now a programmer would consider this to be significantly less complex (measured by the number of lines of code necessary to predict the emerald's colour), however this is philosophy and therefore we must consider that there exists a bijection between the set of observations contained in both descriptions. IOW, both refer to the same amount of time, therefore there is no increase in plurality.

1: Materialists in the audience may wish to further expand on the concept of 'perception of greeness'. Be my guest but I'm only trying to complicate things by a moderate amount.