Morton Thiokol made the Solid Rocket Boosters. The problems that caused the disaster were known within the company for some time before the launch. One memo , from
Roger Boisjoly on (July 31, 1985) read in part:
"If the same scenorio should occur in a field joint
(and it could), then it is a jump ball as to the
success or failure of the joint because the
secondary O-ring cannot respond to the clevis
opening rate and may not be capable of
pressurization. The result would be a catastrophe
of the highest order--loss of human life."
The night before launch,
NASA had a
teleconference with Morton Thiokol engineers and executives. The engineers told NASA that it was unsafe to launch in the cold temperature.
NASA really wanted to launch. The executives put NASA on hold, and, without the engineers, made a list of reasons why it was safe to launch. When the engineers tried to explain to the executives why it was not safe, they were ignored. The executives then gave NASA the list of reasons that it was safe to launch.
They were not questioned.
After the disaster, management at Morton Thiokol harrassed Boisjoly and other engineers for telling the congressional investigation this. Boisjoly sued under various federal and state statutes, and lost.
Sources: http://onlineethics.org/essays/shuttle/bois.html?text
Westlaw.