Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and a Bit of Perspective
In assessing whether the
atomic attacks on
civilian targets - entire cities - at
Hiroshima and
Nagasaki can be justified, we would be
remiss if we failed to consider the consequences of those attacks, consequences which were surely anticipated. We would be equally remiss to consider any
justification for the attacks in a
vacuum, without examining how any justifications advanced would apply in other cases.
Before the attack, Hiroshima and Nagasaki had
populations of
255,000 and
195,000, respectively. In Hiroshima,
66,000 people were killed (
25.8% of the population) and
69,000 (
27%) injured. In Nagasaki,
39,000 (20%) were killed and
25,000 (12.8%) injured.
95% of the
casualties were civilians. Many more would suffer the long-term effects of massive
radiation exposure. By way of
comparison, the attack on the
naval base at
Pearl Harbor killed
2408 people and wounded
3596. The civilian casualties at Pearl Harbor were
68 dead and
35 wounded (
1.6% of total casualties). These
figures, which certainly must be considered in determining whether the attacks were justified, regardless of how one ultimately
resolves the issue, are
conspicuously absent from the other
writeups in this
node.
It is argued that the attacks on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941 provide justification for dropping the
atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki As this is the easiest
argument to dispose of, I will consider it first. Consider the following assertion:
If you get into an argument with somebody at a bar because you spilled his beer and refused to buy him another one, you are in the wrong, and he has every right to tell everyone in the bar what a prick you are. If he breaks into your house with a knife, later that night, he's now in the wrong, and you are within your rights to shoot him.
This argument might be valid if there were a certain degree of rough
proportionality between the attack providing justification and the
response. Here, however, there is no proportionality.
32 times as many people were killed in the atomic attacks at Hiroshima and Nagasaki as were at Pearl Harbor; moreover, this does not include the long-term effects of the attacks. The disproportionality becomes even more obvious when we note that
98.4% of the casualties at Pearl Harbor were
military, as opposed to
5% at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Beyond the obvious disproportionality, this argument is
inapposite in another respect. "If he breaks into your house with a knife" assumes a degree of necessity that is not present in the case of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Moreover, under the law, even
self-defence must must be proportionate to the
danger presented by the
assailant and not exceed the amount of
force reasonably necessary to
ward off the danger.
We must also consider what else this
theory would justify. The basic
proposition is that an attack on a military facility justifies an attack on civilian targets with
predicted casualties of many times the number of casualties caused by the original attack. Certainly, we must allow others the same generous
moral standard we allow ourselves. Recently, in an unprovoked attack, in direct violation of
international law, "with the expressed [sic] intent of taking over [their], country," the
United States and the
United Kingdom killed up to
10,000 Iraqi civilians (not including deaths due to the indirect, but predictable, consequences of the choice of targets) and did immeasurable damage to facilities protected under the
Geneva Conventions. By the standard that is advanced in defence of the atomic attacks at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Iraq, would be justified in dropping atomic bombs on the United States and the UK and killing up to
320,000 civilians. Similarly, much of
Latin America would be entitled to lay waste to
New York,
Los Angeles, and
Washington, D.C., and
Vietnam would be entitled to kill fully
36% of the U.S. population. Or, to put it in the terms of the
analogy cited above, if A breaks into B's house with a knife, B is entitled not only to kill A, but to kill 31 of A's relatives, friends, and
neighbours, giving those in their immediate
vicinity cancer. This
logic will serve only as a rather
gruesome solution to the world's
overpopulation problem.
It has also been suggested that Japanese
atrocities during World War II justified the use of weapons of mass destruction against Japanese civilians. First, it is important to note that this
rationalisation is entirely
retrospective. No one was thinking in those terms at the time. Moreover, it is worth noting that Japanese atrocities against people in
Asia rarely merit a mention as "atrocities" in the US, where the only atrocities generally referred to as such are the attack on Pearl Harbor and the treatment of
Allied P.O.W.'s (which, in terms of atrocity, was approximately the same level as U.S. treatment of Japanese P.O.W.'s). However, assuming that the atrocities of the Japanese military against
Chinese and other civilians could justify the use of
weapons of mass destruction by the U.S. against Japanese civilians, we are left with the same issue as with the Pearl Harbor argument. Indeed, at least the Pearl Harbor argument has the merit of being relatively limited, as only the directly aggrieved party may kill the other country's civilians. With this argument, on the other hand, all limitations disappear. If country A's soldiers commit atrocities against country B's civilians, country C (any country in the world) may commit atrocities against country A's civilians. An equally gruesome solution to the overpopulation problem, even if it would likely play out much faster than the one described above.
The
notion that the attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were necessary in order to end the war quickly and prevent "
500,000 American deaths" involves a certain degree of
speculation. Thus, I will limit myself to what is known of the U.S.
decisionmaking process at the time. The
500,000 figure is several times the number of deaths anticipated by the
Department of War at the time. Even assuming
arguendo that this figure were correct, the necessity of an invasion in order to end the war was by no means the way it was seen in Washington at the time. Japan had made repeated
diplomatic overtures, seeking to end the
hostilities, up until the time of the atomic attacks. According to
General Henry H. "Hap" Arnold, Commanding
General of the U.S.
Army Air Forces under
Truman, "It always appeared to us that, atomic bomb or no atomic bomb, the Japanese were already on the verge of collapse." Similarly, then-General
Dwight D. Eisenhower noted
"I had been conscious of depression and so I voiced to [Secretary Of War Stimson] my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at this very moment, seeking a way to surrender with a minimum loss of 'face.' "
Eisenhower noted on another occasion that "Japan was at the moment seeking some way to surrender with minimum loss of 'face'… It wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing."
Similar views were echoed throughout the U.S.
high command. In 1946, the U.S.
Strategic Bombing Survey noted that
"Certainly prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."
Nor were they alone. Harry Truman's 18 July 1945 diary entry read: "P.M. [
Churchill] & I ate alone. Discussed Manhattan (it is a success). Decided to tell
Stalin about it. Stalin had told P.M. of telegram from
Jap Emperor asking for peace."
Thus, in the view of those in charge of the
war, even before Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan was looking for a way out. Indeed, the only thing preventing a Japanese surrender was a matter of
semantics: Japan wanted to surrender unconditionally without using the words "
unconditional surrender." While the question of
what would have happened is by its nature speculative and cannot be answered conclusively, those who made the decision to drop the bombs did so in the belief that the bomb would be of "no
material assistance in our war against Japan." (
Admiral William D. Leahy). What the man who broke into your house with a knife would have done had you not shot him is certainly not easily answered, but if you knew he didn't pose a
threat at the time you shot him, you can't later claim self-defence, and you certainly can't claim to be justified in going out and killing 31 of his friends and neighbours at
random.