(Sektion 141: Philosophische Untersuchungen von Ludwig Wittgenstein).
141. But what if not simply the picture of the cube, but also the method of projection came before us?----How should I think of this?--Perhaps I see a schema of the kind of projection before me. A picture of two cubes connected by a kind of projection comes before me. A picture of two cubes connected through lines of projection comes before me.--But then does this get me closer? Can't I also think of a different use of these schemas?----Yes but, then, can't an application come before me?--It can, only we must become clear about our application of this expression. Imagine that I explained to someone different methods of projection, so that he could then apply these; and we ask ourselves in which case we would say that the method of projection that I intend comes before him.
We know that we accept two kinds of criteria for this: on the one hand the picture (whatever kind that it is) which at some time comes before us, and on the other hand the application that, in the course of time, he makes of what he imagines. (And isn't it clear here that it is absolutely inessential that this picture comes before him as a fantasy, and not rather as a drawing or a model; or also something that he constructs as a model?)
Could now picture and application collide? They can collide only insofar as the picture causes us to expect another application; because people generally make this application of this picture.
I want to say: There exists here a normal case, and abnormal cases.