On September 24, 2002
, The British Government released a 'dossier of evidence' on the military capabilities of Iraq
Entitled Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction - The Assessment of the British Government
, it became
publicly available (as a 55 page PDF
document) at 08:00 BST
was recalled for an emergency session to discuss the
issues raised at 11:30 BST
on the same day.
Many people will see this publication as a PR
exercise which makes the public feel that they have seen some facts written down and distributed to the people.
serve to digest the background of the problem, although its use beyond preparing the public for war seems unclear.
The report contains an introduction from the Prime Minister
, Tony Blair
It is unprecedented for the Government to publish this kind of document. But in light of the debate about Iraq and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), I wanted to share with the British public the reasons why I believe this issue to be a current and serious threat to the UK national interest.
What is obvious is that the document contains little or no new information, and even less that is proven fact.
Excusing the lack of hard evidence
in the document, Blair says
Gathering intelligence inside Iraq is not easy. Saddam is one of the most secretive and
dictatorial regimes in the world. So I believe people will understand why the Agencies
cannot be specific about the sources, which have formed the judgements in this
document, and why we cannot publish everything we know. We cannot, of course,
publish the detailed raw intelligence. I and other Ministers have been briefed in detail on
the intelligence and are satisfied as to its authority.
His summary, outlining the next steps as he sees them, reads
The case I make is that the UN resolutions demanding he stops his WMD programme are being flouted; that since the inspectors left four years ago, he has continued with this programme; that the inspectors must be allowed back in to do their job properly; and that if he refuses, or if he makes it impossible for them to do their job, as he has done in the past, the international community will have to act.
I won't post the full thing here (because it's long, it's easy to get elsewhere and it contains images)
but, to pique your interest, here are just the table of contents and the executive summary from the document
Part 2: History of UN Weapons Inspections
Part 3: Iraq under Saddam Hussein
- Foreword by the Prime Minister
- Executive Summary
- Part 1: Iraq's Chemical, Biological, Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programmes
- Chapter 1: The role of intelligence
- Chapter 2: Iraq's programmes 1971-1998
- Chapter 3: The current position 1998-2002
- Under Saddam Hussein Iraq developed chemical and biological weapons,
acquired missiles allowing it to attack neighbouring countries with these
weapons and persistently tried to develop a nuclear bomb. Saddam has used
chemical weapons, both against Iran and against his own people. Following the
Gulf War, Iraq had to admit to all this. And in the ceasefire of 1991 Saddam
agreed unconditionally to give up his weapons of mass destruction.
- Much information about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction is already in the
public domain from UN reports and from Iraqi defectors. This points clearly to
Iraq's continuing possession, after 1991, of chemical and biological agents and
weapons produced before the Gulf War. It shows that Iraq has refurbished sites
formerly associated with the production of chemical and biological agents. And
it indicates that Iraq remains able to manufacture these agents, and to use bombs,
shells, artillery rockets and ballistic missiles to deliver them.
- An independent and well-researched overview of this public evidence was
provided by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) on
9 September. The IISS report also suggested that Iraq could assemble nuclear
weapons within months of obtaining fissile material from foreign sources.
- As well as the public evidence, however, significant additional information is
available to the Government from secret intelligence sources, described in more
detail in this paper. This intelligence cannot tell us about everything. However,
it provides a fuller picture of Iraqi plans and capabilities. It shows that Saddam
Hussein attaches great importance to possessing weapons of mass destruction
which he regards as the basis for Iraq's regional power. It shows that he does not
regard them only as weapons of last resort. He is ready to use them, including
against his own population, and is determined to retain them, in breach of United
Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCR).
- Intelligence also shows that Iraq is preparing plans to conceal evidence of these
weapons, including incriminating documents, from renewed inspections. And it
confirms that despite sanctions and the policy of containment, Saddam has
continued to make progress with his illicit weapons programmes.
- As a result of the intelligence we judge that Iraq has:
- continued to produce chemical and biological agents;
- military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, including
against its own Shia population. Some of these weapons are deployable
within 45 minutes of an order to use them;
- command and control arrangements in place to use chemical and biological
weapons. Authority ultimately resides with Saddam Hussein. (There is
intelligence that he may have delegated this authority to his son Qusai);
- developed mobile laboratories for military use, corroborating earlier reports
about the mobile production of biological warfare agents;
- pursued illegal programmes to procure controlled materials of potential use
in the production of chemical and biological weapons programmes;
- tried covertly to acquire technology and materials which could be used in the
production of nuclear weapons;
- sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa, despite having no
active civil nuclear power programme that could require it;
- recalled specialists to work on its nuclear programme;
- illegally retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles, with a range of 650km,
capable of carrying chemical or biological warheads;
- started deploying its al-Samoud liquid propellant missile, and has used the
absence of weapons inspectors to work on extending its range to at least
200km, which is beyond the limit of 150km imposed by the United Nations;
- started producing the solid-propellant Ababil-100, and is making efforts to
extend its range to at least 200km, which is beyond the limit of 150km
imposed by the United Nations;
- constructed a new engine test stand for the development of missiles capable
of reaching the UK Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus and NATO members
(Greece and Turkey), as well as all Iraq's Gulf neighbours and Israel;
- pursued illegal programmes to procure materials for use in its illegal
development of long range missiles;
- learnt lessons from previous UN weapons inspections and has already begun
to conceal sensitive equipment and documentation in advance of the return
- These judgements reflect the views of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).
More details on the judgements and on the development of the JIC's assessments
since 1998 are set out in Part 1 of this paper.
- Iraq's weapons of mass destruction are in breach of international law. Under a
series of UN Security Council Resolutions Iraq is obliged to destroy its holdings
of these weapons under the supervision of UN inspectors. Part 2 of the paper sets
out the key UN Security Council Resolutions. It also summarises the history of
the UN inspection regime and Iraq's history of deception, intimidation and
concealment in its dealings with the UN inspectors.
- But the threat from Iraq does not depend solely on the capabilities we have
described. It arises also because of the violent and aggressive nature of Saddam
Hussein's regime. His record of internal repression and external aggression gives
rise to unique concerns about the threat he poses. The paper briefly outlines in
Part 3 Saddam's rise to power, the nature of his regime and his history of regional
aggression. Saddam's human rights abuses are also catalogued, including his
record of torture, mass arrests and summary executions.
- The paper briefly sets out how Iraq is able to finance its weapons programme.
Drawing on illicit earnings generated outside UN control, Iraq generated illegal
income of some $3 billion in 2001.
The official release URLs from which the document can be obtained are listed at the end of the document as
Most of those sites were experiencing severe problems on the morning of the 24th. If you have problems, a mirror
of the PDF can be found here: