Contract Theory

Patrick Bolton and Mathias Dewatripont
ISBN 0-262-02576-0

  • Introduction
  • part I Static Bilateral Contracting.
    1. Hidden Information, Screening.
    2. Hidden Information, Signaling.
    3. Hidden Information, Moral Hazard.
    4. Disclosure of Private Certifiable Information.
    5. Multidimensional Incentive Problems.
  • part II Static Multilateral Contracting.
    1. Multilateral Asymmetric Information: Bilateral Trading and Auctions.
    2. Multiagent Moral Hazard and Collusion.
  • part III Repeated Bilateral Contracting.
    1. Dynamic Adverse Selection.
    2. Dynamic Moral Hazard.
  • part IV Incomplete Contracts.
    1. Incomplete Contracts and Institution Design.
    2. Foundations of Contracting with Unverifiable Information.
    3. Markets and Contracts.