It has long been a habit of the human race to anthropomorphize those things with which it finds itself sharing it's environment. People have said that the sun wanted to burn them and that their car fostered a dislike for them and even that their computer smugly refused to do what it was told. When talking about human tools, such as thermostats and guidance systems, it can be extremely convenient to discuss them as if they had certain beliefs, intentions and desires, such as believing it to be above a certain temperature or intending to reach a certain destination. In the attempt to explain the workings of the mental, this anthropomorphization has caused a question to be raised: "Do these objects actually possess these mentalistic properties?"

There are two fundamental ways of answering this question chosen by philosophers of mind. Those of the first camp(in the tradition of Fodor and Searle) would emphatically state: "No!". On the other hand, those of the second camp(of whom Dennett is the most vocal, but counts Haugeland and the Churchlands among his supporters) would say "No" with a smirk, and then after a few moments add: "Well, maybe..."

The mentalistic properties known as beliefs, intentions and desires(among others) are all propositional, they have a certain "aboutness". It is this aboutness which is the crux of the debate. It is unclear at first how something can be about something else. If a person believes that the sky is blue, we say that that belief is "about" the sky; the belief has a direct referrent in the real world. It is much less clear whether or not it can be said that a painting of a blue sky is "about" the sky. Even more uncertainty is introduced when one considers the idea of misrepresentation, such as when a person believes they see a rock when actually looking at a turtle.

Searle quite happily agrees about the meaning of the person's belief that the sky is blue as being about the sky. He calls this "Original Meaning" and claims that it is irreducible to simpler assignations and that it is precise(there is a specific object, the sky, which this belief is about). Searle then labels the meaning of the painting as simply "Derived Meaning" in that it is about the sky only in so much as the creator of the painting was intending it to be about the sky and that alternate interpretations are possible and valid in which the painting could perhaps be about the ocean.

Another example(this one taken from Dennett) is that of a quarter-detecting device used in an American soda machine. This device emits a certain response when certain conditions generally associated with the presence of an American quarter are met. This device is a quarter-detector so long as it is used in this capacity and for this period of time, it can be said to be doing things which are in a certain way about quarters. If however this device was transported to Panama and the residents there began using it for the purpose of detecting the Panamanian Quarter-Balboa(which is in many ways physically indistinguishable from an American quarter), it could then be said that the machine is doing things which are about quarter-balboas. The reason for this indeterminacy of meaning despite a consistency of behaviour is due(according to Searle, Fodor, et al.) to the fact that the detector's behaviour has only derived meaning and can said to be about quarters or quarter-balboas only in so much as that is what it's human agent is intending it to be about. In both these cases, it could be imagined that a quarter-detector could misrepresent a quarter-balboa as a quarter, or vice-versa, but still there is an alternate interpretation in which the detector could be said to detect neither quarters nor quarter-balboas but rather any object of a certain compostion(specifically, the precise composition which elicits a certain response from the detector). It is easily seen that in this interpretation there is no meaning, only definition, and there is no possibility of a misrepresentation because anything detected is necesarrily a member of the class of things which the detector detects. Searle and Fodor hold that this is the proper interpretation of the apparent mentalistic behaviour of artifacts, action bereft of any meaning or representation except that bestowed upon it in a derivative fashion by the manner of it's use or creation.

Dennett however goes on to observe that humans are(in a materialist philosophy) to a certain extent simply machines designed by Nature and Evolution for the purpose of survival. He holds that every human action is interpretable as having meaning only in so much as it was intended to have that meaning in order to survive. He claims that a system which in a human(or other animal) identifies a predator, is only about predators in that it is intended to be about predators in a survival sense. In this view there is a second interpretation, devoid of original meaning, in which the biological mechanism for detecting predators is as much about any object misidentified as a predator as it is about bona fide predators. Dennett also holds that there are parallel analogies in humans to the quarter/quarter-balboa example where something so simple as a change in locale could cause two fundamentally different objects to cause fundamentally identical beliefs.

From here Dennett, having begun by agreeing that artifacts could have no original meaning and having continued by extrapolating that humans could possess no such thing either, goes on to say that, unless there was conscious design behind the creation of the human mind, there can be no original meaning at all. He holds that people are, in effect, just complex thermostats and guidance systems with derived or, as he prefers, functional meaning. So perhaps, in its own limited way, a thermostat has a belief after all. Yet still, it seems quite likely that there is a significant line to be drawn somewhere between the basic, manufactured, predictable "beliefs" and "intentions" of simple artifacts and the emergent unpredicatable mentalistic phenomena evident in humans.