The Rise of Nasserism (Part 2) - The Rise of Nasserism (Part 3)
Building Up Egypt
Much has been written of
Nasser's concept of three overlapping circles - the
Arab,
Muslim and
African worlds – to which he believed
Egypt was central, and around which its
foreign policy should be shaped. It was certainly the case that Nasser was to make Egypt an active rather than a
passive player in all three worlds and in the wider international effort towards positive neutralism in the emerging
Third World. But in his early years Nasser was to be less
concerned with defining Egypt's new approach to the
various circles than in making its mark with regard to the
old world of the
West, and in particular
Europe's declining
dominance in the
Middle East.
A more
stable period had been during the days of the
Ottoman Empire, especially while
Britain propped up the
Sultanate as cover for her penetration of the Middle East,
including of course Egypt, before the Ottomans threw in
their lot with
Germany and crumbled after the
First World
War. Then Britain had to come more publicly to the fore
with her “moment” in the Middle East, which centred on
Egypt and the arrangements for her “
independence” in
1922, as well as establishing the
Hashemite monarchies in
Iraq and
Jordan, taking the mandate directly in
Palestine,
and exercising great influence throughout the
Arabian
peninsula. Behind Britain had come
France with their
position in the
Maghreb, as well as the home of Arab
nationalism,
Syria. For Britain, the Middle East had been
largely a staging post for the East, to which the French-
built, but mainly British-owned,
Suez Canal was central. In
the inter-war period, however, the growth of
oil production
around the
Gulf was making the region vital not only for
imperial communications but for the powering of the international
economy as well.
Anglo-Egyption Relations
After the
Second World War it was clear that the position
of the West was unravelling. Britain's empire in the
East
had been sorely dented, and
India's independence in
1947
formally underlined that fact, as well as serving as an
inspiration for
nationalists elsewhere. In the Middle East
itself, Anglo-Egyptian relations were deteriorating rapidly,
contributing to the decay of the
monarchy and the whole
Egyptian political system; British equivocation had contributed to the emergence of
Israel out of the Arab debacle
of the Palestine war; the collapse of France in the war had
led to the precarious independence of Syria and
Lebanon;
while the Arabian peninsula looked scarcely more stable.
Britain, however, appeared reluctant to accept this decline,
especially the
Conservative government elected in 1951,
led by
Churchill and later
Eden. There were repeated
attempts at settlement with Egypt, but without the mutual
fear engendered by Germany and
Italy in 1936 no agreement had proved possible. Instead the
United States and
Britain sought to concentrate upon the “northern tier”,
from
Turkey to
Pakistan, hence the lengthy and apparently
successful negotiation of the
Baghdad Pact of 1955. The
pact had started as a part of the scheme of America's Secretary of State,
John Foster Dulles, to contain the
Soviet
Union with
anti-communist alliances on all flanks. Originally involving the non-Arab states of Turkey and Pakistan in
1954, it was Britain that sought in 1955 to bring Iraq into
the centre of the pact, which was also signed by
Iran.
Britain's decline in the post-war years was not confined
to the Middle East or matters imperial, but was the beginning of the end of her position as a world
power, however
reluctant some quarters, notably the
Conservative Party,
were to recognise it. In place of the domination of European imperialism there were now the superpowers, the
United States and the Soviet Union, whose sheer scale had
been converted into the power to win the Second World
War and divide Europe; but who had also become bitter
post-war enemies in other areas including the Middle East.
Though geographically more remote it was the United
States, the more
cosmopolitan of the two
superpowers, for
all the proclaimed internationalism of
Marxism—
Leninism,
which took up the running. It also had great interests, notably its oil business in
Saudi Arabia, and there was as well growing domestic support for Israel.
There was an
ambivalence in American policy towards
the Middle East, and in Arab reactions thereto. Ideologically, the United States was as hostile to imperialism as the
Soviet Union, while also believing that the European
powers were overstretched. Thus at one level there was
some recognition of
Arab nationalism, if it could take a
reforming and moderate line. Yet the above-mentioned
interests contributed to deep flaws so far as Arab nationalists
were concerned. Foremost amongst these was of course
American support for Israel, though under
Eisenhower
after 1952 it was to prove rather less of a reflex action in
Washington than it had been under
Truman. At the same
time American oil interests were tied up with some of the
most conservative and anachronistic rulers in the Middle
East, in the eyes of Arab nationalists at least, and hence
America appeared linked to reaction rather than progress.
It was understandable that from Egypt's viewpoint all this
was not simply a matter of “foreign policy” but central to
the character of political and economic development. Politically it had been ruled by invaders for centuries, and
even the “independence” settlement of 1922 had been dictated by the last occupying power, Britain, and the latter's
position had continued, though deteriorating, right down
to the revolution of 1952. Egypt's final independence, it
was clear, would depend not only on developments within
the country, but in the Middle East as a whole. At the same
time, Egypt's economy had been significantly influenced by
the
industrialisation of the West, especially the growth of
the British
textile trade. Large
landowners, many of non-
Egyptian background, had developed their
cotton crops
which had become the country's leading export. Any major
economic change would involve both the landholdings of
major producers and the diversification of economic
activity.
While this was the general context, there was nothing
initially to suggest that the
Free Officers, let alone Nasser,
had a clear idea of the
policy to be pursued, provided that
it continued the throwing off of
foreign domination and
restoration of Egypt's
dignity. There was no reason to
regard Nasser as intrinsically
anti-Western, indeed he had
admired through his reading a
pantheon of Western
heroes, but in addition to his natural caution and suspicion, as well as a certain pride and prickliness, he needed
to be treated with care as he found his feel in international
politics. The Americans initially seemed quick to appreciate
this, with
CIA figures
Miles Copeland and
Kermit Roosevelt
developing personal relations with Nasser that contributed
to early Egyptian criticism of him. But the real duel was to
be with Britain, whose position in the Middle East seemed
so uncertain, following the Free Officers'
coup.
Sudan
On the face of it, the central question should have been
British troops in Egypt, but as seen, other issues emerged
to produce bigger problems in Anglo-Egyptian relations,
especially their developing
rivalry in the south and north.
The rivalry over
Sudan has attracted less attention than
that surrounding the
Baghdad Pact, but in fact it was
regarded as crucial by Egypt. Egypt had long claimed
Sudan, arguing that there was no meaningful border between
the two countries and that Sudan had legally been Egypt's
since the conquest at the start of the nineteenth century.
Nasser as a
saidi from upper Egypt was hardly likely to
regard a line drawn across
Nubia as anything other than a
highly artificial division. Egypt's interest was not only
historical, for through Sudan flowed the
Nile on which Egypt
was dependent, and she was potentially a rival for the water
which had been divided to Egypt's advantage by Britain in
1929 and was to be renegotiated. In addition to water there
had long been suggestions that land-hungry Egypt, with her fast-
growing population might utilise the underpopulated Sudan,
both to relieve pressure at home and produce more food.
In the repeated negotiations over Sudan, which had continued intermittently since 1924 (with only a brief success
in 1936), Egypt had insisted on linking a defence agreement with Britain to progress on Egypt's claim to
sovereignty over Sudan, and this had always proved the reason for failure. However, the
RCC took a new and radical line
by appearing to separate the two questions from the outset.
By doing so, and thanks to the success of the half-Sudanese
Neguib in winning over all major Sudanese parties to
Egypt's proposal of a free choice on the country's future,
the Egyptians were able to force Britain onto the defensive.
Much to the chagrin of British officials in Sudan, the
Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1953 on the future of Sudan
was largely a surrender of Britain's position coupled with a
promise of self-determination for the Sudanese.
With the confidence gained from that perceived success
Egypt then prepared to negotiate on the British bases. By
then Britain had come to realise how exposed a position
it was in. Its huge base (the largest she had in the
world) and personnel had been subject to
guerrilla attacks,
which successive Egyptian governments had done little to
halt, and to which it could offer little response. At the
same time her capacity to intervene in Egyptian politics
had long since disappeared, as events of “
Black Saturday”
and the 23 July coup had demonstrated. Nasser for his part
persuaded his reluctant RCC colleagues of the need for the
agreement to include a clause by which the bases could be
reactivated in time of war, while the whole deal was helped
by the sweetener from America of aid if agreement was
reached. Negotiations proceeded smoothly and by October
1954 the treaty was signed. All British troops were to be
withdrawn, and British civilian contractors and Egyptians
were to work together in the bases which would be maintained for reactivation in the event of attack by an outside
power (a provision which specifically excluded Israel).
Thus far Nasser had been engaged in successfully negotiating an end to the old problems of Anglo-Egyptian relations, defence and Sudan. (If on Sudan he appeared to have the better of the deal, there were those who felt that
on defence he had been too moderate, especially on the
reactivation clauses.) But in the months that followed the
defence treaty, he began to suspect that, far from withdrawing, Britain was, so to speak, really only rearranging the
furniture in the Middle East, and once more to the detriment of Egypt. That detriment was most directly shown up
in Sudan, when Britain had decided that in being forced
into what she regarded as a precipitate withdrawal she
would encourage Sudanese politicians of all parties to seek
full independence rather than union with Egypt. Indeed
events in Egypt, and between Egypt and Sudan, conspired
to aid Britain in what was undoubtedly her objective. The
fall of the half-Sudanese Neguib went down badly in
Sudan, as did the execution of
Muslim Brothers in Egypt.
At the same time Egyptian-Sudanese negotiations on the
Nile waters faired badly since Sudan wanted a less unequal
division than that of 1929, and was angered by Egyptian
intransigence. By mid-1955 it was clear that the earlier
interest of the Sudanese in union with Egypt was much
diminished, and Britain underlined this by encouraging
Sudan's unilateral declaration of independence that eventually took place in January 1956, without formal prior acceptance by Britain and Egypt as legal
co-domini.
Baghdad Pact
The other area where Nasser's suspicions were being
aroused was in the development of the Baghdad Pact of
1955. To Britain the pursuit of the Baghdad Pact was the
evolution of the “northern tier” of Middle East defence,
linking countries immediately adjacent to the Soviet Union
in a pact that would contain the latter and protect Western
interests. To Nasser, however, it spelt the revival of an idea
already made to Egypt and rejected in 1951. A way out of
the failure of Anglo-Egyptian talks then preferred by
Britain, with American encouragement, was a joint defence
treaty based on Egypt, but including other Middle Eastern
states. Egypt had rejected what was then seen as camouflage for continued British
involvement; but it now
appeared that the same idea was being proposed, based
this time on Iraq rather than Egypt, including also Turkey
and Pakistan, and possibly seeking to embrace Syria, Lebanon
and Jordan as well. To Nasser the Baghdad Pact was another attempt by large
states to dominate smaller ones and
use them in
struggles not of their making. Agreements
such as he himself had just signed with Britain were
quite sufficient and there was no need for further
pacts. Moreover, by bringing in non-Arab states and linking them with the northern Arab states the Baghdad Pact
was seeking to divide the Arab world. While within the
Middle East the pact would promote the importance of oil-
rich Iraq to pose a challenge to Egypt's growing leadership
in the region.
Arab Nationalism
By this time too another aspect of Nasser's thinking was
emerging, that of Arab nationalism. An
indigenous Egyptian, his sense of being an Arab is believed to have been
considerably enhanced by his experiences in the Palestine
war. Egypt also was the home of the
Arab League, founded
with British encouragement at the end of the Second
World War, in the hope that it would contribute to what
British Foreign Secretary
Ernest Bevin thought optimistically would be a freer and more equal period of cooperation between Britain and the peoples of the Arab world.
While the Arab League had hitherto been notably unsuccessful, Nasser saw it as a means of giving Egyptian leadership to the Arabs, centred as it was in
Cairo. And the initial task in achieving this was to oppose the division within the
Arab world threatened by the Baghdad Pact. To underline
Arab unity, Cairo
radio stations began to broadcast
Sawt al-Arab (Voice of the Arabs), the first international programmes by a Middle Eastern country. They became highly
popular and carried the concept of Nasser's revolution to
the Arab masses with notable success. But as well as
becoming popular it also both opened up and altered the
character of Arab
political dialogue. Broadcasts were
abusive of Nasser's opponents and highly
vituperative,
arousing emotions behind Nasser's message of
Arab unity
and freedom from imperialism and those rulers depicted
as its local
lackeys. The masses were being invited to join in
the game of politics, but their role was less than clear.
The proposed Baghdad Pact would damage Nasser's
emerging dream of the fulfilment of the commitment to
the Arab circle. In consequence Nasser used all his
influence to try to abort the
pact, while pouring forth a
tirade of
propaganda against the rulers who appeared
ready to bend to Britain's wish. Bitter though the struggle
was between Nasser and Iraq's pro-British premier,
Nuri
Said, Nasser did appear ready to compromise, considering
at one time accepting the pact if limited to Iraq, Turkey
and Pakistan. Britain, however, still hoped for more, particularly from Jordan. And when the Baghdad Pact was eventually agreed, in January 1955, it was an important step in furthering the mutual suspicions of Egypt and
Britain; and even personally of Nasser and Britain's new
prime minister,
Sir Anthony Eden, who had succeeded the
ailing
Sir Winston Churchill and regarded himself as both
an
Orientalist and a leading figure in
international politics,
with experience of confronting the European
dictators before the Second World War.
Part of Nasser's opposition to the Baghdad Pact lay in
the delivery of British
arms to Iraq at a time when Egypt's
own armoury was in dire need of
modernization. The
agreement with Britain on the bases, and especially the apparent American offer of support once it was completed,
appeared to hold out what Nasser sought. But in the
months that followed it was increasingly clear that neither
country was keen to rearm Egypt, except on stringent
terms concerning the use of any
weapons supplied - in
effect an attempt to link Egypt's foreign policy to that of
the West (and to protect Israel) which was precisely what
Egypt sought to avoid. For Egypt the situation was worsening, not just due to the Western arm twisting, but because
of a more aggressive policy by Israel, concerned to
flex their
muscles in the face of the new
regime in Egypt, allegedly to
contain
fedayeen guerilla raids against Israel. On 28 February 1955 there was a major raid against Egyptian troops
in
Gaza by
Israeli forces, which to the suspicious Nasser
smelled of
collusion with the West to pressure Egypt. It
redoubled his determination to acquire new arms, and also
led him for the first time to encourage fedayeen attacks on
Israel.
Non-Alignment
Shortly after this, in April 1955, Nasser went to the first
non-aligned conference in
Bandung,
Indonesia, hosted by
Sukarno. Nasser was the youngest leader present, and the
meeting was to have an important impact on him. In itself
the growth of the
non-aligned movement was a response to
a combination of the ending of formal imperialism and its
apparent replacement by the
Cold War, in which the
United States and the Soviet Union appeared as rivals in
wishing to extend their influence to the newly independent
states. Among these emerging countries a few leaders were
achieving a significance that transcended national boundaries, and at the same time seeking to come together to
create a new movement, helping each other towards a
more neutral international perspective, and a freer, fairer
world. These were sentiments towards which Nasser instinctively felt drawn, even before he attended the famous non-aligned meeting at Bandung. There he met and was impressed, perhaps even a little awed, by India's
Pandit
Nehru, as well as
China's
Chou En-Uai, who suggested and
then arranged for the subsequent
arms deal with the Soviet
Union. He also met another figure whose support was to
be useful in subsequent years,
Yugoslavia's Marshal
Tito.
Tito was to show him that links with the Soviet Union
could be developed without the latter becoming the dominant partner in the relationship, as indeed it was never to
do in Egypt in spite of its long and vital support to Nasser
from 1956 until his death. Such men recognised Nasser's
importance in the Middle East and treated him as an
equal. He in turn felt the growing confidence to patronise
the emerging figures, such as
Kwame Nkrumah of
Ghana,
who in a number of ways aspired to be the Nasser of Africa,
and whose name was often to evoke a similar response,
whether positive or negative.
The most important immediate outcome of Bandung
was the Soviet arms deal which, in a scarcely veiled effort to
soften the hostility of the West, was nominally with
Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union showed an initial caution,
for her penetration of the Middle East was in reality far less
than that depicted by Western scaremongers, while the
RCC had taken a tough line with Egyptian
communists. But
Soviet foreign policy was as much opportunistic as ideological: Egypt seemed too good an opportunity to miss, and a deal was offered on easy terms. Even so Nasser tried to use it as a bargaining card with his preferred suppliers in the
West, and waited two months for them to change their policy. But the West now accused Nasser of
blackmailing them
with threats, just as he had criticized their original terms
for supplying him with arms, and they held up their hands
in horror when in September 1955 the “
Czech” arms deal
finally went through. After it Nasser remarked, “We would
have preferred to deal with the West, but for us it was
a
matter of life and death.”
”Czech” Deal
The impact of the arms deal in the West, which saw itself
as centrally involved in the Cold War, was enormous. Britain
felt that her own agreement with Egypt to leave the
Suez
bases was rejected, for the reactivation clauses had in effect
been in case of Soviet hostility in the Middle East, and now
the
USSR was supplying Egypt. It undermined the Western
monopoly of arms to the Middle East which seemed the
major lever with which to try to establish the position
there, possibly even leading to negotiation between the
Arabs and Israel. With the deal the way was open to escalate an arms race in the region with uncontrollable political results. The concept of the “northern tier” on which the Baghdad Pact was based of containing the Soviet Union
was also aborted at a stroke, for now the Soviet Union had
gained a foothold south of that line. For Nasser of course,
all this was irrelevant. Rather than trying to control the
Middle East by defence pacts, the legitimate claims of Arab
states should have been recognised, including the need to
rearm Egypt. And while friends warned him of the
dangers of over-involvement with the Soviet Union, he had
no intention of negotiating Britain's withdrawal only to
replace it with Soviet control. He did not share the vision
of international politics as dominated by superpower
rivalry. On the contrary his visit to Bandung had opened
his eyes to the possibilities of non-alignment and closer
relations with other developing countries, as well as both
East and West.
In Nasser's view he had been driven into the “Czech”
arms deal because of Western reluctance to provide him
with the weapons he sought, and he was to feel similarly
betrayed in another area he regarded as vital to the attainment of full independence for Egypt - the building of the
High Dam at
Aswan. The High Dam has been seen as symbolic, as Egypt's new
pharaoh building his
pyramid, and
just about as impractical since it has been criticized for
both its position and its effect: it would have controlled the
Nile more effectively if sited further south, while some
damaging side effects such as
silting were being overlooked. Yet there was also a strong case for a new high dam
at Aswan. Throughout the twentieth century there had
been repeated plans, barrages and dams designed to improve the hydrology of the Nile, ranging from the
Owen Falls dam at
Jinja in
Uganda, where the Nile leaves
Lake Victoria, to the barrages north of Cairo controlling the
flow into the
delta. Mighty though the Nile is in length, it
does not carry a vast flow of water compared with other
great rivers of the world, such as the
Amazon or
Ganges.
Moreover, the
population of Egypt (approaching 24 million
by the time of the revolution) is wholly dependent on the
river. More water was therefore needed to
irrigate new land
and ensure the food security of the fast-growing society.
And though hydrologically there was a case for building a
new dam further south in Sudan, like the Egyptian dam on
the White Nile at
Jebel Aulia, just south of
Khartoum,
where Nasser had been stationed, politically the uncertainty over future relations between the two countries
ensured that first priority should be for a high dam on
Egyptian territory. From Aswan it would be possible to
guarantee water supplies for the foreseeable future, provide
for the expansion of the area under irrigation and produce
hydroelectricity which would power the growth of industry
in Egypt. The combination of a stronger economy and a
re-equipped army would finally ensure that Egypt had
attained the full independence that had been so much a
part of the ambitions of Nasser and his fellow
Free Officers.
The background of the “Czech” arms deal had ensured
that from early on in the pursuit of the necessary foreign
investment and technical assistance for the High Dam,
Nasser knew that he had the option of help from the Soviet
Union. Nevertheless, as with the arms, his early expectations lay with the West. British hydrologists had been deeply
involved in earlier developments, the United States was the
world's richest country, and the
World Bank, the most
appropriate institution to coordinate such a project, was
based in Washington. Initially there was Western support,
partly because the US Secretary of State, Dulles, still had
hopes of influence in Egypt, and partly because of Eden's
wish to keep the Soviet Union out of further involvement
there. The first tricky hurdle involved negotiations between
Nasser and the World Bank, for the former was no economist and believed that some of the conditions for the
massive project amounted to handing over Egypt's management of economic policy to foreigners again - a spectre
which only eighty years earlier under
Ismail had led first to
creditor-management of the country and then to Britain's
invasion in 1882. Eventually, however, there was agreement,
but by then America in particular was beginning to have
doubts. Dulles was turning against the scheme for a num-
ber of reasons associated with his attitude to Nasser, including the pressure of the
Zionist lobby in Congress. In
addition Dulles was worried by Egypt's recognition of communist China, which Nasser saw as an alternative potential
source of weapons when talks between Eden and
Khrushchev
in London briefly threatened a new arms
embargo to the
Middle East. Then in the summer of 1955 Dulles
announced that the United States had finally decided that
the whole project was too big for the Egyptian economy to
sustain, and it was pulling out of the funding scheme (He
also thought that it was too big a project for the Soviet
Union to take over). With Dulles's decision, the World Bank
and Britain had little alternative other than to follow suit.
Suez Canal - The Beginning
Nasser was a man of
political imagination, as well as
audacity, as the coup had shown, and even before the announcement from America it was clear that he had been
contemplating financing the High Dam by seizing the Suez
Canal. The canal was owned by an international company
dominated by British and French shareholders. Many of its
officials, including most of the pilots, were also Europeans,
and it was regarded as one of the most vital waterways for
Western Europe, indeed in view of the importance of
Middle Eastern oil, for the world economy as a whole. The
canal agreement with Egypt, renegotiated in 1949, gave
Egypt a mere 7 per cent of gross
profits and only a minor
presence on the
board of directors. The Suez Canal
Company's concession was due to expire in 1968, but the
Company had made it clear that it would only renegotiate
the existing terms if that concession period was extended.
There is little doubt that for Nasser taking over the canal
was not just a matter of money, for in itself the income
would be insufficient to build a dam which clearly needed
help from a major international power, and it was once
more partly symbolic. If the West was withdrawing from
financing the dam, why should it continue without
interference to be the primary beneficiary of one of the
world's major waterways traversing Egyptian territory?
Nasser's plan had the agreement of the RCC, but very
few others were in the know when he went to make a
speech in Alexandria in July 1956. Always the careful
plotter, he had arranged that when he mentioned the
canal's builder,
Ferdinand de Lesseps Egyptian officials
and police would move in and seize the Company's offices
on the canal. The nationalized canal would then be run for
the benefit of Egypt, in particular the building of the High
Dam, and Egypt would thereby be taking two major steps
to asserting her full independence. Such a
master stroke,
delivered with such style and timing in
Alexandria on 26
July, and simultaneously on the canal itself, was widely
hailed as the greatest step thus far by the revolution, and
made Nasser a
leader not just of Egypt but Arab nationalism throughout the Middle East.
The Rise of Nasserism (Part 2) - The Rise of Nasserism (Part 3)