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As soon as the ambitious mind of
Artaxerxes had triumphed ever the resistance of his vassals, he began to threaten the
neighboring states, who, during the long slumber of his predecessors, had insulted
Persia with impunity. He obtained some easy
victories over the wild Scythians and the
effeminate Indians; but the
Romans were an enemy, who, by their past injuries and
present power, deserved the utmost efforts of his arms. A forty years' tranquillity, the fruit of valor and
moderation , had
succeeded the victories of
Trajan . During the period that elapsed from the accession of Marcus to the reign of
Alexander, the
Roman and the
Parthian empires were twice engaged in war; and although the whole strength of the Arsacides contended with
a part only of the forces of Rome, the event was most commonly in favor of the latter. Macrinus, indeed, prompted by his
precarious situation and
pusillanimous temper, purchased a peace at the expense of near two millions of our money;
37 but the
generals of Marcus, the emperor
Severus , and his son, erected many trophies in
Armenia,
Mesopotamia , and
Assyria. Among
their exploits, the imperfect relation of which would have unseasonably interrupted the more important series of domestic
revolutions, we shall only mention the repeated calamities of the two great cities of Seleucia and Ctesiphon.
Footnote 37: Dion,
l. xxviii. p. 1335.
Seleucia, on the western bank of the
Tigris, about forty-five miles to the north of ancient
Babylon, was the capital of the
Macedonia n conquests in Upper Asia.
38 Many ages after the fall of their empire, Seleucia retained the genuine characters of
a Grecian
colony , arts,
military virtue , and the love of
freedom. The independent republic was governed by a senate of three
hundred nobles; the people consisted of six hundred thousand citizens; the walls were strong, and as long as concord prevailed
among the several orders of the state, they viewed with
contempt the power of the
Parthian: but the madness of faction was
sometimes provoked to implore the dangerous aid of the common enemy, who was posted almost at the gates of the
colony .
39 The
Parthian monarchs, like the Mogul sovereigns of Hindostan, delighted in the pastoral life of their Scythian ancestors;
and the Imperial camp was frequently pitched in the plain of Ctesiphon, on the eastern bank of the
Tigris, at the distance of only
three miles from Seleucia.
40 The innumerable attendants on
luxury and
despotism resorted to the court, and the little village of
Ctesiphon insensibly swelled into a great city.
41 Under the reign of Marcus, the
Roman generals penetrated as far as
Ctesiphon and Seleucia. They were received as friends by the
Greek colony ; they attacked as enemies the seat of the
Parthian
kings; yet both cities experienced the same treatment. The sack and
conflagration of Seleucia, with the massacre of three
hundred thousand of the inhabitants, tarnished the
glory of the
Roman triumph.
42 Seleucia, already exhausted by the
neighborhood of a too powerful rival, sunk under the fatal blow; but Ctesiphon, in about thirty- three years, had sufficiently
recovered its strength to maintain an
obstinate siege against the emperor
Severus . The city was, however, taken by assault; the
king, who defended it in person, escaped with precipitation; a hundred thousand captives, and a rich booty, rewarded the
fatigues of the
Roman soldiers.
43 Notwithstanding these misfortunes, Ctesiphon succeeded to
Babylon and to Seleucia, as
one of the great capitals of the East. In summer, the monarch of
Persia enjoyed at Ecbatana the cool breezes of the mountains
of
Media ; but the mildness of the climate engaged him to prefer Ctesiphon for his winter residence.
Footnote 38: For the precise situation of Babylon, Seleucia, Ctesiphon, Moiain, and Bagdad, cities often confounded with
each other, see an excellent Geographical Tract of M. d'Anville, in Mem. de l'Academie, tom. xxx.
Footnote 39: Tacit. Annal.
xi. 42. Plin. Hist. Nat. vi. 26.
Footnote 40: This may be inferred from Strabo, l. xvi. p. 743.
Footnote 41: That most curious
traveller, Bernier, who followed the camp of Aurengzebe from Delhi to Kashmir , describes with great accuracy the immense
moving city. The guard of cavalry consisted of 35,000 men, that of infantry of 10,000. It was computed that the camp
contained 150,000 horses, mules, and elephants; 50,000 camels, 50,000 oxen, and between 300,000 and 400,000 persons.
Almost all Delhi followed the court, whose magnificence supported its industry .
Footnote 42: Dion, l. lxxi. p. 1178. Hist. August. p. 38. Eutrop. viii. 10 Euseb. in Chronic. Quadratus (quoted in the Augustan
History) attempted to vindicate the Romans by alleging that the citizens of Seleucia had first violated their faith.
Footnote 43: Dion, l. lxxv. p. 1263. Herodian , l. iii. p. 120. Hist. August. p. 70.
From these successful inroads the
Romans derived no real or lasting benefit; nor did they attempt to preserve such distant
conquests, separated from the provinces of the empire by a large tract of inter
Media te desert. The reduction of the kingdom of
Osrhoene was an acquisition of less
splendor indeed, but of a far more solid advantage. That little state occupied the northern
and most fertile part of
Mesopotamia , between the
Euphrates and the
Tigris. Edessa, its capital, was situated about twenty
miles beyond the former of those rivers; and the inhabitants, since the time of
Alexander, were a mixed race of
Greeks,
Arabs,
Syrians, and
Armenians.
44 The feeble sovereigns of Osrhoene, placed on the dangerous verge of two contending empires,
were attached from inclination to the
Parthian cause; but the superior power of Rome exacted from them a reluctant homage,
which is still attested by their medals. After the conclusion of the
Parthian war under Marcus, it was judged prudent to secure
some substantia, pledges of their doubtful fidelity. Forts were constructed in several parts of the country, and a
Roman garrison
was fixed in the strong town of Nisibis. During the troubles that followed the death of
Commodus, the princes of Osrhoene
attempted to shake off the yoke; but the stern policy of
Severus confirmed their dependence,
45 and the perfidy of
Caracalla
completed the easy conquest. Abgarus, the last king of Edessa, was sent in chains to Rome, his dominions reduced into a
province, and his capital dignified with the rank of
colony ; and thus the
Romans, about ten years before the fall of the
Parthian
monarchy , obtained a firm and permanent establishment beyond the
Euphrates.
46
Footnote 44: The polished citizens of Antioch called those of Edessa mixed barbarians. It was, however, some praise, that of
the three dialects of the Syriac, the purest and most elegant (the Aramaean) was spoken at Edessa. This remark M. Bayer
(Hist. Edess. p 5) has borrowed from George of Malatia, a Syrian writer.
Footnote 45: Dion, l. lxxv. p. 1248, 1249, 1250. M. Bayer has neglected to use this most important passage.
Footnote 46: This kingdom, from Osrhoes, who gave a new name to the country, to the last Abgarus, had lasted 353 years.
See the learned work of M. Bayer, Historia Osrhoena et Edessena.
Prudence as well as glory might have justified a war on the side of
ArtaXerxes , had his views been confined to the defence or
acquisition of a useful frontier. but the ambitious
Persian openly avowed a far more extensive design of conquest; and he
thought himself able to support his lofty pretensions by the arms of reason as well as by those of power. Cyrus, he alleged, had
first subdued, and his successors had for a long time possessed, the whole extent of Asia, as far as the Propontis and the
Aegean Sea; the provinces of Caria and
Ionia , under their empire, had been governed by
Persian satraps, and all
Egypt, to the
confines of Aethiopia, had
acknowledged their sovereignty.
47 Their rights had been suspended, but not destroyed, by a long
usurpation; and as soon as he received the
Persian diadem, which birth and successful valor had placed upon his head, the first
great duty of his station called upon him to restore the ancient limits and
splendor of the
monarchy . The Great King, therefore,
(such was the haughty style of his embassies to the emperor
Alexander,) commanded the
Romans instantly to depart from all
the provinces of his ancestors, and, yielding to the
Persians the empire of Asia, to content themselves with the undisturbed
possession of
Europe. This haughty mandate was delivered by four hundred of the tallest and most beautiful of the
Persians;
who, by their fine horses, splendid arms, and rich apparel, displayed the pride and greatness of their master.
48 Such an
embassy was much less an offer of
negotiation than a declaration of war. Both
Alexander Severus and
ArtaXerxes , collecting
the
military force of the
Roman and
Persian monarchies, resolved in this important contest to lead their armies in person.
Footnote 47:Xenophon, in the preface to the Cyropaedia, gives a clear and magnificent idea of the extent of the empire of
Cyrus. Herodotus (l. iii. c. 79, &c.) enters into a curious and particular description of the twenty great Satrapies into which the
Persian empire was divided by Darius Hystaspes.
Footnote 48: Herodian , vi. 209, 212.
If we credit what should seem the most authentic of all records, an oration, still extant, and delivered by the emperor himself to
the senate, we must allow that the victory of
Alexander Severus was not inferior to any of those formerly obtained over the
Persians by the son of Philip. The army of the Great King consisted of one hundred and twenty thousand horse, clothed in
complete armor of steel; of seven hundred elephants, with towers filled with archers on their backs, and of eighteen hundred
chariots armed with scythes. This formidable host, the like of which is not to be found in eastern history, and has scarcely been
imagined in eastern
Romance,
49 was discomfited in a great battle, in which the
Roman Alexander proved himself an
intrepid
soldier and a skilful general. The Great King fled before his valor; an immense
booty, and the conquest of
Mesopotamia , were
the im
Media te fruits of this signal victory. Such are the circumstances of this
ostentatious and improbable relation, dictated, as it
too plainly appears, by the
vanity of the monarch, adorned by the unblushing
servility of his flatterers, and received without
contradiction by a distant and
obsequious senate.
50 Far from being inclined to believe that the arms of
Alexander obtained
any memorable advantage over the
Persians, we are induced to suspect that all this blaze of i
Magi nary glory was designed to
conceal some real disgrace.
Footnote 49: There were two hundred scythed chariots at the battle of Arbela, in the host of Darius . In the vast army of
Tigranes, which was vanquished by Lucullus, seventeen thousand horse only were completely armed. Antioch us brought
fifty-four elephants into the field against the Romans: by his frequent wars and negotiation s with the princes of India, he had
once collected a hundred and fifty of those great animals; but it may be questioned whether the most powerful monarch of
Hindostan evci formed a line of battle of seven hundred elephants. Instead of three or four thousand elephants, which the Great
Mogul was supposed to possess, Tavernier (Voyages, part ii. l. i. p. 198) discovered, by a more accurate inquiry, that he had
only five hundred for his baggage, and eighty or ninety for the service of war. The Greeks have varied with regard to the
number which Porus brought into the field; but Quintus Curtius, (viii. 13,) in this instance judicious and moderate, is contented
with eighty-five elephants, distinguished by their size and strength. In Siam, where these animals are the most numerous and the
most esteemed, eighteen elephants are allowed as a sufficient proportion for each of the nine brigades into which a just army is
divided. The whole number, of one hundred and sixty-two elephants of war, may sometimes be doubled. Hist. des Voyages,
tom. ix. p. 260.
Note: Compare Gibbon's note 10 to ch. lvii - M.
Footnote 50: Hist. August. p. 133.
Note: See M. Guizot's note, p. 267. According to the Persian authorities Ardeschir extended his conquests to the Euphrates.
Malcolm i. 71. - M.
Our suspicious are confirmed by the authority of a contemporary historian, who mentions the
virtue s of
Alexander with respect, and his faults with candor. He describes the judicious plan which had been formed for the conduct of
the war. Three
Roman armies were destined to invade
Persia at the same time, and by different roads. But the operations of the
campaign, though wisely concerted, were not executed either with ability or success. The first of these armies, as soon as it had
entered the marshy plains of
Babylon, towards the artificial conflux of the
Euphrates and the
Tigris,
51 was encompassed by
the superior numbers, and destroyed by the arrows of the enemy. The alliance of Chosroes, king of
Armenia,
52 and the long
tract of mountainous country, in which the
Persian cavalry was of little ser
vice, opened a secure entrance into the heart of
Media , to the second of the
Roman armies. These brave troops laid waste the adjacent provinces, and by several successful
actions against
ArtaXerxes , gave a faint color to the emperor's
vanity. But the retreat of this victorious army was imprudent, or
at least unfortunate. In repassing the mountains, great numbers of soldiers perished by the badness of the roads, and the
severity of the winter season. It had been resolved, that whilst these two great detachments penetrated into the opposite
extremes of the
Persian dominions, the main body, under the command of
Alexander himself, should support their attack, by
invading the centre of the kingdom. But the unexperienced youth, influenced by his mother's counsels, and perhaps by his own
fears, deserted the bravest troops, and the fairest prospect of victory; and after consuming in
Mesopotamia an inactive and
inglorious summer, he led back to
Antioch an army diminished by sickness, and provoked by
disappointment . The behavior of
ArtaXerxes had been very different. Flying with rapidity from the hills of
Media to the marshes of the
Euphrates, he had
everywhere opposed the invaders in person; and in either fortune had united with the ablest conduct the most undaunted
resolution. But in several
obstinate engagements against the veteran legions of Rome, the
Persian monarch had lost the flower of
his troops. Even his victories had weakened his power. The favorable opportunities of the absence of
Alexander, and of the
confusions that followed that emperor's death, presented themselves in vain to his ambition. Instead of expelling the
Romans, as
he pretended, from the continent of Asia, he found himself unable to wrest from their hands the little province of
Mesopotamia .
53 Footnote 51: M. de Tillemont has already observed, that Herodian 's geography is somewhat confused.
Footnote 52: Moses of Chorene (Hist. Armen. l. ii. c. 71) illustrates this invasion of Media , by asserting that Chosroes, king of
Armenia, defeated ArtaXerxes , and pursued him to the confines of India. The exploits of Chosroes have been magnified; and he
acted as a dependent ally to the Romans.
Footnote 53: For the account of this war, see Herodian , l. vi. p. 209, 212. The old abbreviators and modern compilers have
blindly followed the Augustan History.
The reign of
ArtaXerxes , which, from the last defeat of the
Parthians, lasted only fourteen years, forms a memorable aera in the
history of the East, and even in that of Rome. His character seems to have been marked by those bold and commanding
features, that generally distinguish the princes who conquer, from those who inherit an empire. Till the last period of the
Persian
monarchy , his code of laws was respected as the groundwork of their civil and religious policy.
54 Several of his sayings are
preserved. One of them in particular discovers a deep insight into the
constitution of
government . "The authority of the prince,"
said
ArtaXerxes , "must be defended by a
military force; that force can only be maintained by taxes; all taxes must, at last, fall
upon
agriculture ; and
agriculture can never flourish except under the protection of
justice and
moderation ."
55 ArtaXerxes
bequeathed his new empire, and his ambitious designs against the
Romans, to Sapor, a son not unworthy of his great father; but
those designs were too extensive for the power of Persia, and served only to involve both nations in a long series of destructive
wars and reciprocal calamities.
Footnote 54: Eutychius, tom. ii. p. 180, vers. Pocock. The great Chosroes Noushirwan sent
the code of ArtaXerxes to all his satraps, as the invariable rule of their conduct.
Footnote 55: D'Herbelot, Bibliotheque Orientale, au mot Ardshir.
We may observe, that after an ancient period of fables, and a long interval of darkness, the modern histories of Persia begin to
assume an air of truth with the dynasty of Sassanides.
Compare Malcolm, i. 79. - M.
The
Persians, long since civilized and
corrupted, were very far from possessing the martial independence, and the
intrepid hardiness, both of mind and body, which
have rendered the northern barbarians masters of the world. The science of war, that constituted the more rational force of
Greece and Rome, as it now does of
Europe, never made any considerable progress in the East. Those
disciplined evolutions
which harmonize and animate a confused multitude, were unknown to the
Persians. They were equally unskilled in the arts of
constructing, besieging, or defending regular
fortifications. They trusted more to their numbers than to their courage; more to
their courage than to their
discipline. The infantry was a half-armed, spiritless crowd of peasants, levied in haste by the
allurements of
plunder , and as easily dispersed by a victory as by a defeat. The
monarch and his nobles transported into the
camp the pride and
luxury of the seraglio. Their
military operations were impeded by a useless train of women, eunuchs, horses,
and camels; and in the midst of a successful campaign, the
Persian host was often separated or destroyed by an unexpected
famine.
56 Footnote 56: Herodian , l. vi. p. 214. Ammianus Marcellinus, l. xxiii. c. 6. Some differences may be observed
between the two historians, the natural effects of the changes produced by a century and a half.
But the nobles of Persia, in the bosom of
luxury and
despotism , preserved a strong sense of personal
gallantry and national
honor. From the age of seven years they were taught to speak truth, to shoot with the bow, and to ride; and it was universally
confessed, that in the two last of these arts, they had made a more than common
proficiency .
57 The most distinguished youth
were educated under the monarch's eye, practised their exercises in the gate of his palace, and were severely trained up to the
habits of temperance and obedience, in their long and laborious parties of hunting. In every province, the satrap maintained a
like school of
military virtue . The
Persian nobles (so natural is the idea of
feudal tenures) received from the king's bounty lands
and houses, on the condition of their
service in war. They were ready on the first summons to mount on horseback, with a
martial and splendid train of followers, and to join the numerous bodies of guards, who were carefully selected from among the
most robust slaves, and the bravest adventures of Asia. These armies, both of light and of heavy
cavalry , equally formidable by
the
impetuosity of their charge and the rapidity of their motions, threatened, as an impending cloud, the eastern provinces of the
declining empire of Rome.
58
Footnote 57: The Persians are still the most skilful horsemen, and their horses the finest in the East.
Footnote 58: From Herodotus, Xenophon, Herodian , Ammianus, Chardin, &c., I have extracted such probable accounts of
the Persian nobility, as seem either common to every age, or particular to that of the Sassanides.
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To cite original text:
Gibbon, Edward, 1737-1794.
The history of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire. 1st ed. (London : Printed for W. Strahan ; and T. Cadell, 1776-1788.), pp. 209-216.