IV
Let us resume our inquiry and state, in view of the fact that all
knowledge and every pursuit aims at some good, what it is that we
say political science aims at and what is the highest of all goods
achievable by action. Verbally there is very general agreement; for
both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say
that it is happiness, and identify living well and doing well with
being happy; but with regard to what happiness is they differ, and
the many do not give the same account as the wise. For the former
think it is some plain and obvious thing, like pleasure, wealth, or
honour; they differ, however, from one another- and often even the
same man identifies it with different things, with health when he
is ill, with wealth when he is poor; but, conscious of their ignorance,
they admire those who proclaim some great ideal that is above their
comprehension. Now some thought that apart from these many goods there
is another which is self-subsistent and causes the goodness of all
these as well. To examine all the opinions that have been held were
perhaps somewhat fruitless; enough to examine those that are most
prevalent or that seem to be arguable.
Let us not fail to notice, however, that there is a difference between
arguments from and those to the first principles. For Plato, too,
was right in raising this question and asking, as he used to do, 'are
we on the way from or to the first principles?' There is a difference,
as there is in a race-course between the course from the judges to
the turning-point and the way back. For, while we must begin with
what is known, things are objects of knowledge in two senses- some
to us, some without qualification. Presumably, then, we must begin
with things known to us. Hence any one who is to listen intelligently
to lectures about what is noble and just, and generally, about the
subjects of political science must have been brought up in good habits.
For the fact is the starting-point, and if this is sufficiently plain
to him, he will not at the start need the reason as well; and the
man who has been well brought up has or can easily get startingpoints.
And as for him who neither has nor can get them, let him hear the
words of Hesiod:
Far best is he who knows all things himself;
Good, he that hearkens when men counsel right;
But he who neither knows, nor lays to heart
Another's wisdom, is a useless wight.
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