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87. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Vienna, June 4, 1961, 10:15 a.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, USSR. Secret.
Drafted by Akalovsky. According to another copy the memorandum of conversation
was approved by the White House on June 23. (Department of State, Conference
Files: Lot 66 D 110, CF 1901) The meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy.
A summary of the conversation was transmitted in Secto 25 from Vienna, June
5, (Ibid., Central Files, 751J.00/6-561)
SUBJECT
Meeting Between The President and Chairman Khrushchev in Vienna
PARTICIPANTS
US
The President
The Secretary
Ambassador Bohlen
Ambassador Thompson
EUR--Mr. Kohler
D--Mr. Akalosvky (interpreting)
USSR
Chairman Khrushchev
Foreign Minister Gromyko
Mr. Dobrynin, Chief, American Countries Division, USSR Ministry of Foreign
Affairs
Ambassador Menshikov
Mr. Sukhodrev, Interpreter, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs
During the exchange of amenities, the President asked Mr. Khrushchev
what part of the USSR he was from. Mr. Khrushchev replied that he had been
born in Russia, in a village in the vicinity of Kursk, 7 to 10 kilometers
from the Ukrainian border, but that he had spent the early part of his life
in the Ukraine. In this connection, he mentioned that recently very large
deposits of iron ore had been found near Kursk. The deposits already prospected
are estimated at 30 billion tons. The general estimate of these particular
deposits is about 300 billion tons. Mr. Khrushchev said that according to
US official statistics total deposits of iron ore in the US are estimated
at 5 billion tons. Thus, he said, Soviet deposits will be sufficient to cover
the needs of the entire world for a long time to come.
The President observed that he wondered why then the Soviet Union was interested
in Laos.
Mr. Khrushchev said that the Soviet Union was not interested in Laos, but
that it was the US which had created the Laotian situation.
The President said that he was not sure whether Mr. Khrushchev and himself
could reach agreement on all the items under discussion, but he appreciated
the frankness and precision with which the positions had been stated. Yet
he believed that agreement could be reached on the question of Laos. Yesterday,
both sides had agreed that Laos was of no strategic importance and was not
vital to either side./2/ However, the United
States became involved in Laos by treaty and other commitments. The President
said that his interest was to secure a cease-fire and to stop the fighting.
This, he thought, would be in the interest of both sides. Then a government
could be secured which would not be weighted in either direction. The President
referred to the remarks made yesterday regarding the situation in Burma
and Cambodia, which appeared to be satisfactory to both sides, and said
that agreement on Laos should be possible along the same lines. However, the
first problem is to stop the fighting. In our view military activities are
still going on in some areas of Laos. We have information that Viet Minh
forces are involved, while Mr. Khrushchev said that Thais were involved. If
the Co-Chairmen of the Conference were to instruct jointly the ICC to make
a determination as to the actual situation, the ICC should go to both sides
and make its investigation. The President then referred to Mr. Khrushchev's
statement yesterday in which he took issue with what he called the Dulles
policy of strength. The President said he wanted to change US policy in this
area because Laos was of no strategic importance. In the eyes of the world,
both sides are involved in the Laotian situation; the United States wishes
to reduce its involvement and hopes that the Soviet Union wishes the same.
However, the President continued, as President he has certain responsibilities
and if he changes US policy he must see that it works. The United States
also wants to secure a government which both sides could support. If the situation
can be changed, and Mr. Khrushchev said yesterday that it should be changed,
then we could proceed with other matters. Laos is not so important as to get
us as involved as we are.
/2/See Document 86.
Mr. Khrushchev said that he agreed with the President's concluding remark.
The Soviet Union has no commitment in Laos, has never undertaken any obligations
in that area, and will not do so in the future. If the Soviet Union has helped
Laos it has been only at the request of Souvanna Phouma, who represents
the only legitimate Laotian Government. That Government was ousted by external
forces supported by the US. This is why the Soviet Union cannot recognize
any other government. The Soviet Union has no vested interest in Laos, either
political or economic, or of any other nature. That country is far from Soviet
borders. In general the Soviet Union has no desire of committing itself or
assuming responsibilities in the various geographic areas. So when the President
says that the United States has commitments, this makes a bad impression
upon the USSR. The US has no right to distribute indulgences, as it were,
and to interfere in the various areas of the world. Mr. Khrushchev said he
liked the concluding part of the President's remarks to the effect that the
two countries should not get involved. This is a correct approach but it would
be bad if the United States were to attempt to claim special rights on the
grounds that it had vested interests. If the President would pardon the blunt
expression, such policy stems from megalomania, from delusions of grandeur.
The United States is so rich and powerful that it believes it has special
rights and can afford not to recognize the rights of others. The Soviet Union
cannot reconcile itself with such a situation and will not concede its own
rights. The Soviet Union will also help other peoples obtain their independence.
This is a correct policy. If we want to normalize the situation and prevent
conflicts between our two countries anywhere in the world, the US should
not seek any special rights. The Soviet Union cannot accept the thesis of
"don't poke your nose" because wherever the rights of the people are infringed
upon, the Soviet Union will render assistance to the people. This, of course,
aggravates the situation and the Soviet Union does not wish such a development.
The situation should be normalized. The US should respect the rights of other
peoples, the Soviet people as well as other peoples. The Soviet Union does
not wish to divide the world. It has no commitment anywhere other than toward
the Socialist countries. On the other hand, the United States has spread
its forces all over. But time has changed. As the President has stated, the
forces of the two sides are not in balance. Mr. Khrushchev said that he
was making this statement not for the purpose of argument but only to recognize
this fact. A great deal of restraint is required because the factors of prestige
and national interests are involved here. We should not step on each other's
toes and should not infringe upon the rights of other nations, small or big.
The President said that, frankly speaking, he had assumed office on January
20th and that the obligations and commitments had been undertaken before that
time. Why these obligations and commitments were undertaken and what factors
were involved at that time is not an issue here. The United States and the
USSR should adopt the policy of creating a neutral and independent Laos.
This is what the United States wants to do. The President reiterated that
he did not want to increase US commitments but rather decrease them. There
is no point in raking over past history to which Mr. Khrushchev objects. There
are some facts in past history to which the United States also objects. But
this is not an issue here. What is an issue here, is how to secure a cease-fire
and to have the fighting stop. The United States wishes a government in Laos
which would not be involved either with the United States or with the USSR,
but would rather be genuinely neutral. The US went to the Conference with
the genuine expectation that arrangements could be made to ensure an effective
verification of the cease-fire and that the next step would be the creation
of a truly neutral Laos. The United States does not believe that there is
an effective cease-fire in Laos. But whatever the facts of past history
we should now act in such a way as to pursue the policy of ensuring a truly
neutral and independent Laos, which we believe is also Soviet policy.
Mr. Khrushchev replied that he could subscribe to everything the President
had said and that he fully associated himself with the President's remarks,
which he liked very much. However, there was one point he wanted to make.
The President had said that the Laotian situation was a legacy, but one could
see in that situation the President's own hand as well. The President had
ordered that US military advisers in Laos should wear US military uniforms;
he had also ordered a landing of Marines in Laos but the order had been
rescinded.
The President interjected that there had been no order for a landing of Marines. True, there had been some speculation as to what action the US would take, but such an order had never been issued. Mr. Khrushchev responded by saying that he was referring to press reports.
Mr. Khrushchev went on to say that the President's argument would be that
all these commitments had been made by the previous administration. However,
the Soviet Government has rescinded all the unreasonable decisions made
by the previous governments under Malenkov and Bulganin./3/
Mr. Khrushchev recalled the argument he had had with Molotov/4/
on the Austrian problem. As a result of his having overruled Molotov, a
satisfactory solution of the problem was found and the US and the USSR
signed the Austrian Treaty. Mr. Khrushchev said that he was sensitive with
regard to US commitments. He said that the Westerners were much better than
the Easterners at making threats in a refined way. Every once in a while
it is intimated that Marines might be used. But as engineers know the law
of physics says that every action causes counter-action. So if the United
States were to send Marines, other countries might respond with their Marines
or with some other forces. Thus another Korea or an even worse situation
might result. Mr. Khrushchev repeated that he liked the President's statement
because it reflected the Soviet policy; in fact, the President seemed to have
stated the Soviet policy and called it his own. The Soviet Union could guarantee
that it would exert every effort to achieve a settlement. But this depends
not merely on our two countries but on the three forces in Laos as well. Agreement
between our two countries would be insufficient. However, we should influence
the Laotian forces so that a truly neutral government could be established.
Mr. Khrushchev said that he believed that the United States had no economic
interest in Laos. The President had mentioned yesterday US strategic interests
in connection with Taiwan. But this, as was mentioned yesterday, could mean
that the United States could also take over Crimea because that would of
course improve its strategic position too. Here the policies of the USSR and
the US are not only in contrast but even in direct conflict. Such policy should
be cast away and a reasonable policy should be adopted. In any event, the
two Foreign Ministers could discuss the details of the Laotian question.
They should be locked in a room and told to find a solution.
/3/Georgi M. Malenkov, Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers until
February 1955; Nikolai A. Bulganin, Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers
until 1958.
/4/Vyacheslav M. Molotov, Soviet Foreign Minister until May 1956.
FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES - 1961-1963 - Volume V - Soviet Union P47