Freedom of
expression is to be considered as a truly inflammatory topic. However it is
very difficult to argue, in the interest of social cohesion, that the former
should undergo any form of limitation. However it is precisely this argument
that this train of thought will attempt to defend.
“If liberty means anything at all, it
means the right to tell people what they do not want to hear” affirms George Orwell. These words strike at the very essence of the right that is
freedom of expression.
It finds its, most universal, definition under article
19 of the UN’s Declaration of Human Rights in the following terms: “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers”.
It appears
to be self evident that freedom of expression is the fundamental pillar on
which democracy has been built. Accordingly, any effort to limit, all or any
part of it, constitutes an act of censorship, and therefore must be
categorically opposed.
As is the
case in many constitutions, is it not written under article 3 of the French
Constitution of 1958 “That the sovereignty of the nation resides in the people”?
Consequentially, what instrument is better suited to ensure honest governance,
where the will of people is respected, if not that of freedom of expression?
It is
therefore necessary that any analysis of these questions must examine two key
notions; firstly, the incoherent nature of censorship in any democratic
society, and secondly, the latter’s ineffectiveness which renders its use
totally absurd in contemporary society.
It would
appear obvious that the notion of “limited freedom” is a paradox in itself.
The case of Handyside c United Kingdom, which was ruled on by the ECJ in 1976, underlines
the fact that even in the case that the content of a directive is deemed
shocking, or even injurious to some, it remains in the general interest that
the point of view in question be represented.
It is
therefore, quite difficult to comprehend why a notion as fallible as censorship
should be allowed to limit the scope of this freedom?
This is to
say that censorship is a term that evolves according to the political, social and cultural context of a given country. This is exemplified by blasphemy
legislation, which no longer exists in France since the adoption of the law, in
regards to freedom of the press, on the 29th of October, 1881, even
though this is still considered a crime in other European countries such as Germany. This can be explained by the evolution of the role accorded to religion in French society. According to a study conducted by the American institute Gallup in 2009, France is ranked 9th amongst the world least
religious countries. This explains the judiciary’s lassitude to rule in favor
of the protection of religious rights when the latter enters into dispute with
freedom of expression. This demonstrates that the application of the law is
dependant, to a certain extent, on the morals, values and customs of the public
at large, the context of which is constantly evolving.
How then
can censorship be immune to interference if the state were to decide to trample
on the rights of its citizens, in the name of arguments as vague and subjective as “public interest” or maintaining “public order”?
Consequently,
censorship remains too fallible and susceptible to abuse to be utilized as a
limiting instrument of a higher and constant norm, such as freedom of
expression.
Furthermore,
the former has a tendency to limit social debate; this itself calls into
question its purpose of acting in the public’s interest. In France, the Gayssot Act of 1990, which despite its merits, constitutes a dangerous precedent, due to it’s almost Orwellian nature, by outlawing any historical discussion on the
tragedy of the holocaust. The same can be said of State injunctions which have
been used by various governments to control certain fluxes of information. As
is seen in the case of the injunction brought against The Guardian on the 31 of
January 2013 by the British Government, which effectively forced the Newspaper to destroy a hard drive on which documents, given to them by Edward Snowden,
had been stored.
One may conclude
that despite censorship’s appearance of a defending force in protecting the
infringement of the rights of others, it benefits far more the state than its
citizenry.
It is interesting
to underline the fact that the use of censorship has never hindered its systematic violation.
This can be
illustrated by the current state of affairs in China. According to an article
published by the International Courrier on the 24 of September 2014, Chinese activists have begun to use a system of abbreviated URLs to access uncensored mirrored
sites. This demonstrates the will of the individual to express his views is
more important than the obvious risk this poses to his person.
However,
this is not the principal criticism one may level at censorship; the principal argument
being, the emergence of a digital era due to the expansion of the internet. Information
can be exchanged on mass, on a scale so infinitely great, that even the KGB would find the supervision of its contents daunting.
Consequently,
in so called “Democratic” countries such as; the UK or the US, who in the absence
of adequate judicial instruments allowing them to control these fluxes of
information, they are obliged to adopt more restrictive measures in regards to
freedom of expression; such as the Anti Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 or the Patriot Act 2001. However despite the implementation of these
legislative instruments, States are obliged to employ tactics that go beyond
the limits of legality, as can be surmised from the recent scandal involving
the NSA in the Snowden affair.
The fact
that the NSA has currently been brought in front of the Federal Court of the
State of Maryland, for having hacked and stolen data of Wikipedia users, is
very telling. However, the UN’s Consultative Commission on Human Rights published a report on the 22 February 2015, which encourages the incorporation of the dispositions laid out by the Freedom of the Press Act 1881 (In reality
disposes the limits of this freedom) to all access suppliers present on French
soil. This could be the beginning of the end; the age of a censor free internet
may be behind us.
“Where they
burn books, they will also burn people » Heinrich Heine.