A document prepared by the 5412 Committee, and authorised by President Eisenhower in March 1960, giving the lie to the position taken by Nixon in the Fourth Nixon-Kennedy Debate (which see.)

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16 March 1960

A PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST THE CASTRO REGIME

     1. Objective: The purpose of the program outlined herein is to bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the U.S. in such a manner as to avoid any appearance of U.S. intervention. Essentially the method of accomplishing this end will be to induce, support, and so far as possible direct action, both inside and outside of Cuba, by selected groups of Cubans of a sort that they might be expected to and could undertake on their own initiative. Since a crisis inevitably entailing drastic action in or toward Cuba could be provoked by circumstances beyond control of the U.S. before the covert action program has accomplished its objective, every effort will be made to carry it out in such a way as progressiely to improve the capabiliity of the U.S. to act in a crisis.

    2. Summary Outline: The program contemplates four major courses of action:

    a. The first requirement is the creation of a responsible, appealing and unified Cuban opposition to the Castro regime, publicly declared as such and therefore necessarily located outside of Cuba. It is hoped that within one month a political entity can be formed in the shape of a council or junta, through the merger of three acceptable opposition groups : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : (redacted) The council will be encouraged to adopt as its slogan "Restore the

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Revolution", to develop a political position consistent with that slogan, and to address itself to the Cuban people as an attractive political alternative to Castro. This vocal opposition will: serve as a magnet for the loyalties of the Cubans; in actuality conduct and direct various opposition activities : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : (redacted) (Tab A)

    b. So that the opposition may be heard and Castro's basis of popular support undermined, it is necessary to develop the means for more communication to the Cuban people so that a powerful propaganda offensive can be initiated in the name of the declared opposition. The major tool proposed to be used for this purpose is a long and short wave gray broadcasting facility, probably to be located on Swan Island. The target date for its completion is two months. This will be supplemented by broadcasting from U.S. commercial facilities paid for by private Cuban groups : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : (redacted) (Tab B)

    c. Work is already in progress in the creation of a covert intelligence and action organization within Cuba which will be responsible to the orders and directions of the "exile" opposition. Such a network must have effective communication and be selectively manned to minimize the risk of penetration. An effective organization can probably be created within 60 days, : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : :

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: : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : (redacted)

    d. Preparations have already been made for the development of an adequate paramilitary force outside of Cuba, together with mechanisms for the secondary logistic support of covert military operations on the island. Initially a cadre of leaders will be recruited after careful screening and trained as paramilitary instructors. In a second phase a number of paramilitary cadres will be trained at secure locations outside of the U.S. so as to be available for immediate deployment into Cuba to organize, train and lead resistance forces recruited there both before and after the establishment of one or more active centers of resistance. The creation of this capability will require a minimum of six months and probably close to eight. In the meanwhile, a limited air capability for resupply and for infiltration and exfiltration already exists under CIA control and can be rather easily expanded if and when the situation requires, Within two months it is hoped to parallel this with a small air resupply capability under deep cover as a commercial operation in another country.

    3. Leadership: It is important to avoid distracting and devisive rivalry among the outstanding Cuban opposition leaders for the senior role in the

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opposition. Accordingly, every effort will be made to have an ambient, non-ambitious, politically uncontentious chairman selected. The emergence of a successor to Castro should follow careful assessment of the various personalities active in the opposition to identify the one who can attract, control, and lead the several forces. As the possibility of an overthrow of Castro becomes more imminent, the senior leader must be selected, U.S. support focussed upon him, and his build up undertaken.

    4.  : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : : (redacted)

    5. Budget: It is anticipated that approximately ::::::::::: of CIA funds will be required for the above program. On the assumption that it will not

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reach its culmination earlier than 6 to 8 months from now, the estimated requirements for FY-1960 funds is ::::::::: with the balance of ::::::::: required in FY-1961. The distribution of costs between fiscal years could, of course, be greatly altered by policy decisions or unforseen contingencies which compelled accelerated paramilitary operations. (Tab C)

    6. Recommendations: That the Central Intelligence Agency be authorized to undertake the above outlined program and to withdraw the funds required for this purpose as set forth in paragraph 5, from the Agency's Reserve for contingencies.




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