It is often noted that the American presidency has achieved a marked increase in power since the early 1930s. This increase can be linked back to two events vital to the current worldwide political scene: the onset of both the Great Depression and World War II, and Franklin D. Roosevelt's subsequent response. "It takes great crises, such as Roosevelt's hundred days in the midst of the depression...for Presidents to succeed in controlling domestic policy (Wildavsky, 324)." This is a universal political truism: at one extreme, it is easily noted that history's most potent dictators all seized control in any variety of crises, through any circumstance of political protocol; this can be seen dramatically in Hitler's flight to power following the burning of the Reichstag. Roosevelt was presented with an even greater crisis in the Depression: while Germany indeed suffered dramatically from the effects of the Depression, Roosevelt had the sole responsibility of ensuring that the world's most prominent economic power (following the collapse of the Qing dynasty, China was eclipsed by the United States in terms of gross domestic product) recover from history's largest market failure, essentially the
outcome of the entire world's economy. The democratic elements of our government were the catalysts for Roosevelt's seizure of power: after all, it is easier for many to vest trust in one prominent figure rather than a legislative body (a fact shown consistently by the comparison of approval ratings between the President and Congress): many cite the inefficiency of large legislative bodies as a cause of this distrust. The American people, suffering dramatically from the effects of the Depression, were willing to vest much trust in Roosevelt to protect them from further economic crisis, and Roosevelt manipulated this trust to dramatically expand the scope of the federal government's power: the so-called alphabet soup of agencies created by Roosevelt was an unprecedented growth in federal power.
World War II's effect on the federal government's power, though not as prominent as the Depression's, was still quite dramatic. There is an entire manifold of media by which the war allowed for the expansion of the federal government, so for brevity I will elaborate on two vital ones: the American people's desire for strong leadership in a time where the country was under attack (granted, attacks on American soil were minimal, but this has little bearing on the public psychology), and the American people's need for a dynamic figurehead to guide them in an age of massive economic expansion. As noted, a great crisis (or the appearance of one, really) is necessary for an executive to garner control over policy, and no crisis has ever gathered public support as effectively as a threat on national security: people, after all, vest faith and pride in their countries and identify with them; an attack on the country is seen as an attack on them. Although the widespread internment of Japanese Americans could be dismissed as a political aberration, it is truly a direct result and shining example of this aforementioned necessity for protection from some faceless threat: in a time of peace, such an internment would not happen at all; in the event that it did, it would be immediately and forcefully decried and destroyed, but in a time of war, it was excused as an evil necessary to ensuring the nation's integrity.
The executive's affluence in the foreign sphere is much greater than other branches of government: the President, while in many respects subservient to Congress, has the unabridged power to represent his country internationally. "Few failures in domestic policy, Presidents soon realize, could have as disastrous consequences as any one of dozens of mistakes in the international arena (Wildavsky, 326)." Thus, the president acts more often in international politics, creating an expectation and precedent for himself and later presidents, forcing the people to place trust in him and him alone in times of conflict from outside threats through his perceived role. The economic factor of this is no small contributor. The real GDP per capita of the Unites States underwent an unprecedented increase from the military-industrial growth during World War Two, skyrocketing from 8,000 dollars (weighed for inflation) in 1940 to nearly 14,000 dollars in 1943, demonstrating a dramatic increase in productivity in the Unites States; this trend continued, albeit not as dramatically, to the present day: in 2000, the real GDP per capita had reached nearly 34,000 dollars. Although economic concerns are technically the prerogative of Congress, that says little about the expectations of the public. They view the responsibility of the American government now not solely as the welfare of its constituents, but a protectorate by proxy of many other dependent nations: though I hesitate to condemn American presence in other nations as imperialism, it nonetheless creates a system of dependency. The president now, as the bust adorning the mantle of the federal government, is allotted growing jurisdiction over international politics.
These trends are more or less isolated from the rest of the American political sphere. Congress's ability to mandate aspects of international relations is limited mostly to the determination of national policies and the allocation of resources to enforce them (most notably, Congress possesses the ability to declare war, although this is often prompted by the President). The President, on the other hand, has sole authority (albeit delegated somewhat heavily) over the intelligence capabilities of the nation, its assorted diplomatic relations, and its military personnel. (Riesenfeld, 406) The widely held pacifict convictions following the first World War dissipated like smoke in the hurricane of nationalist sentiment that battered the country. A unifying idea of diplomatic murkiness was soon possessed nearly universally: America would start no wars, but would attempt to quell international threats of any sort by any means which were deemed necessary. While the President was still held accountable for his actions internationally, he was no longer constrained by the expectation that no hostile international actions should be taken. In diplomacy, now essentially the president's primary prerogative, the president was now allowed to take whatever actions he deemed necessary.
There are advantages to a dramatically centralized government where much power is wielded in the hands of one, conversely, there are strong disadvantages. The more power the President has, the more ease he has with regards to executing his political agenda. If we are to assume that the interests of the majority are well-placed and that the President has gained significant popular approval, than the President is certain to act in the interest of the majority. While this isn't universally beneficial, it does the most good for as many people as possible, and ensures much governmental efficiency, as the sluggish protocol and so-called "red tape" of bureaucracies and Congress no longer exist to hinder the people's interests. In this situation, it is easy to declare a victory of democracy. We must remember, however, that specific circumstances must exist in order for this to happen: the President must have no interests rather than the good of the people. Let us assume this was a first term President. Now, conversely, let us assume this was a second term President. He is no longer subject to the backlash of popular opinion, as he is prohibited from running for reelection. He is acting completely within his enumerated powers, and, if the Constitution is not to be read literally, and the President assumes he can exercise any powers which are not expressly given to him, he is using those powers as well. The President is now free to do whatever he wants, regardless of any political affiliation. This is happening currently with President Bush: his approval ratings have plummeted, yet he does not appear to be concerned with reconciling his personal interests with that of the nation: in fact, he has begun to fall out of favor with his own party. The oft-noted wave of pardons is one of the concrete examples of this Presidential tendency towards political tangents: Bush's commutation of the prison sentence of Lewis "Scooter" Libby, a public official who had worked closely with the Bush administration, is a particularly criticized example of this. It is immensely difficult to find a justification for this commutation that stands up to scrutiny: furthermore, a Gallup poll regarding Bush's commutation showed a three to one majority that disapproved of it. Presidential clemency has existed for a long time and has always been somewhat controversial in its use; it stands not as an example of the rising potential for executive abuse, rather, it serves to show simply that the President is not in anyway unable to misuse his powers; rather, he will exercise them to his own whim, taking popular opinion into account only as much as he wishes.
While we aren't aware of truly widespread violations of the power vested in the President, there are nonetheless prominent examples of its abuse. The strongest example of this in recent history is the Watergate scandal. Executive privilege, the proclaimed right of the president to withhold any information claimed to be too confidential even for Congress's review, was the battleground over which the president's rights. "Executive privilege because a popular part of the 'checks and balances' counter-point between president and Congress, and presidents have usually had the upper hand when invoking it (Lowi, 228)." Nixon's attempt to wield the powers vested in him in order to conceal incriminating evidence demonstrates that there are potential loopholes susceptible to abuse in his enumerated rights, and the same goes for every president: we can no longer be sure that our system is watertight, and we have no way to determine the damage cause by the flood of corruption. Vesting too much power in one individual was, without doubt, a prominent concern of the founders of our country: having experienced the effects of what they believed to be tyranny, they attempted to destroy its causes. Although we cannot establish a direct link between executive power and tyranny, we may be certain that there is a correlation: history, after all, has taught us the terrible potential of so-called over-centralization.
It is easy to trust a President over a more decentralized system of state or federal legislatures. A human being is, of course, much easier to accumulate trust in than an abstract body. It is vital to remember that there are pitfalls, however, in the accumulation of executive powers; whether enumerated or not, as there are pitfalls in a President who is too unerringly respected. We must remember history's dramatic examples of abuse in the hands of an individual: the cult of personality created by many statist leaders allowed them unsupervised control over the government: short of their death, there was often no method to even remove them from power. In the finest of leaders, this is all and well, but we cannot ensure anyone's continued benevolence by any way but abridging their powers: unabridged power is exactly what has lead to firm oppression and even state-sponsored genocide in the past. "The government which governs best governs least," as Paine noted; history has shown us just how true this is. The Constitutional system of separate institutions sharing powers exists solely to prevent such systematic tyranny: if there are ways, even within the protocol of the Constitution, for any branch of government's power to grow without limit, it is our responsibility to limit their growth.
Works Cited:
Wildavsky, Aaron B. "The Two Presidencies." Classics in American Government. Jay M. Shafritz. Thomson Wadsworth: Toronto, 2007. 323-337.
Riesenfeld, Stefan A. "The Powers of Congress and the President in International Relations: Revisited." California Law Review 75.1 (Jan., 1987): 405-414.
Lowi, Theodore J. et al. "The Presidency as an Institution." American Government. Ed. Peter Lesser. W. W. Norton & Company: New York, 2006. 218-269. |
