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Rule Against Perpetuities

created by spacewrench

(idea) by spacewrench (8.8 mon) (print)   ?   (I like it!) 1 C! Sat Mar 02 2002 at 5:40:39

When the holder of an estate grants or devises it to another, he may wish to control the recipient's use of it. For example, if A owns a mansion, he may wish to leave it to his nephew when he dies, but ensure that his wife can live there until she dies. A, the grantor, can accomplish this by giving in his will a life estate to his wife and the remainder to his nephew. By making such a will, he is able to accomplish his goals, even though he's dead at the time.

The Rule against Perpetuities requires that all such provisions in a will or other grant occur within the time span defined by a life in being at the time of the grant, plus twenty-one years (plus, if one wishes to be excruciatingly correct, an appropriate human gestation period). Any provision that cannot be proven to occur or fail within the time span is invalid and will be stricken from the grant.

In the previous example, it is clear that the nephew (or his heirs) will get the mansion after A's wife dies, so her life can be used as the "measuring life." The mansion will reach its final owner immediately after the wife dies, which is well within the time span determined by her life plus twenty one years.

On the other hand, if A was to will the mansion to his wife for life, then to the first of his nephew's children to turn 25, the second part of the grant fails -- the best measuring life is the nephew, and it's possible that he'd die while all of his children were younger than 3, so even if any of them reach 25, it wouldn't happen within 21 years of the nephew's death. (Of course, if the nephew had any children at the time of the grant, A could fix his will by naming the child, but it's possible that the named child would die before reaching the age of 25.

The key to determining whether a grant satisfies the Rule against Perpetuities is picking an appropriate measuring life. Once the correct life is selected, it's usually trivial to see whether the grant is good.

I hesitate to discuss the history behind this, because I'm just a law student and my goal is to pass the bar, not to write a treatise on property law, but wharfinger asked, so...

The rule originated in the Duke of Norfolk's Case in 1681. At the time, landowners (perhaps only recently landed themselves) were trying to protect their estates and ensure that their heirs couldn't bungle their way back into poverty. However, the various interests in land that are created when somebody tries to control ownership for decades or centuries tend to cruft up the system. After all, who remembers, 50 or 100 years after you die, that you wanted Cousin Bob's third grandchild to have Blackacre if he married the Earl of Fauntleroy's second cousin once removed, unless she was insufficiently pneumatic, in which case Bob's sister Emma's second child Roderick was to inherit? But these people would show up in court with a title to the land and give the judges migraines (not to mention, kicking out whoever happened to be living on the estate at the time.)

So the Rule against Perpetuities is designed to limit the appearance of these litigants and enhance the alienability of the land -- a buyer need not worry so much about Roderick showing up with a good title.

Amazing what one learns in law school...


(idea) by the bloody truth (5.7 y) (print)   ?   (I like it!) Thu Oct 24 2002 at 3:43:39

A notoriously complicated rule of property law, abolished in a number of American jurisdictions and altogether abolished in England. The Rule has plagued law students since the Seventeenth Century.

The aim of the Rule to ensure that a future property interest vest or fail to vest within 21 years of the death of a "validating life." This is merely another way of saying that the purpose of the Rule is to prevent you from writing a will that leaves some piece of property "to my son, then to his child, then to his child," and so on. Legal thinkers viewed this as counter-utilitarian, i.e. that it goes against the best-use principle (land should always be afforded its best use to promote economic growth)and allows a long-dead ancestor to exert control from beyond the grave in deciding who owns what land.


(idea) by eliserh (4 d) (print)   ?   (I like it!) 1 C! Wed Jun 25 2003 at 10:37:19

At least one court has ruled that the Rule Against Perpetuities is so "perplexing" that failure to apply it does not constitute legal malpractise.

Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583; 364 P.2d 685; 15 Cal. Rptr. 821 (Cal. 1961)

Supreme Court of California

Plaintiffs, who are some of the beneficiaries under the will of Eugene H. Emmick, deceased, brought this action for damages against defendant L. S. Hamm, an attorney at law who had been engaged by the testator to prepare the will. They have appealed from a judgment of dismissal entered after an order sustaining a general demurrer to the second amended complaint without leave to amend.

The allegations of the first and second causes of action are summarized as follows: Defendant agreed with the testator, for a consideration, to prepare a will and codicils thereto for him by which plaintiffs were to be designated as beneficiaries of a trust provided for by paragraph Eighth of the will and were to receive 15 per cent of the residue as specified in that paragraph. Defendant, in violation of instructions and in breach of his contract, negligently prepared testamentary instruments containing phraseology that was invalid by virtue of section 715.2 and former sections 715.1 and 716 of the Civil Code relating to restraints on alienation and the rule against perpetuities. n1 Paragraph Eighth of these instruments "transmitted" the residual estate in trust and provided that the "trust shall cease and terminate at 12 o'clock noon on a day five years after the date upon which the order distributing the trust property to the trustee is made by the Court having jurisdiction over the probation of this will." After the death of the testator the instruments were admitted to probate. Subsequently defendant, as draftsman of the instruments and as counsel of record for the executors, advised plaintiffs in writing that the residual trust provision was invalid and that plaintiffs would be deprived of the entire amount to which they would have been entitled if the provision had been valid unless they made a settlement with the blood relatives of the testator under which plaintiffs would receive a lesser amount than that provided for them by the testator. As the direct and proximate result of the negligence of defendant and his breach of contract in preparing the testamentary instruments and the written advice referred to above, plaintiffs were compelled to enter into a settlement under which they received a share of the estate amounting to $ 75,000 less than the sum which they would have received pursuant to testamentary instruments drafted in accordance with the directions of the testator.

* * *

The complaint, as we have seen, alleges that defendant drafted the will in such a manner that the trust was invalid because it violated the rules relating to perpetuities and restraints on alienation. These closely akin subjects have long perplexed the courts and the bar. Professor Gray, a leading authority in the field, stated: "There is something in the subject which seems to facilitate error. Perhaps it is because the mode of reasoning is unlike that with which lawyers are most familiar. . . . A long list might be formed of the demonstrable blunders with regard to its questions made by eminent men, blunders which they themselves have been sometimes the first to acknowledge; and there are few lawyers of any practice in drawing wills and settlements who have not at some time either fallen into the net which the Rule spreads for the unwary, or at least shuddered to think how narrowly they have escaped it." (Gray, The Rule Against Perpetuities (4th ed. 1942) p. xi; see also Leach, Perpetuities Legislation (1954) 67 Harv.L.Rev. 1349 (describing the rule as a "technicality-ridden legal nightmare" and a "dangerous instrumentality in the hands of most members of the bar").) Of the California law on perpetuities and restraints it has been said that few, if any, areas of the law have been fraught with more confusion or concealed more traps for the unwary draftsman; that members of the bar, probate courts, and title insurance companies make errors in these matters; that the code provisions adopted in 1872 created a situation worse than if the matter had been left to the common law, and that the legislation adopted in 1951 (under which the will involved here was drawn), despite the best of intentions, added further complexities. (See 38 Cal.Jur.2d 443; Coil, Perpetuities and Restraints; A Needed Reform (1955) 30 State Bar J. 87, 88-90.)

In view of the state of the law relating to perpetuities and restraints on alienation and the nature of the error, if any, assertedly made by defendant in preparing the instrument, it would not be proper to hold that defendant failed to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as lawyers of ordinary skill and capacity commonly exercise. The provision of the will quoted in the complaint, namely, that the trust was to terminate five years after the order of the probate court distributing the property to the trustee, could cause the trust to be invalid only because of the remote possibility that the order of distribution would be delayed for a period longer than a life in being at the creation of the interest plus 16 years (the 21-year statutory period less the five years specified in the will). Although it has been held that a possibility of this type could result in invalidity of a bequest ( Estate of Johnston, 47 Cal.2d 265, 269-270 (303 P.2d 1); Estate of Campbell, 28 Cal.App.2d 102, 103 et seq. ( 82 P.2d 22)), the possible occurrence of such a delay was so remote and unlikely that an attorney of ordinary skill acting under the same circumstances might well have "fallen into the net which the Rule spreads for the unwary" and failed to recognize the danger. We need not decide whether the trust provision of the will was actually invalid or whether, as defendant asserts, the complaint fails to allege facts necessary to enable such a determination, n3 because we have concluded that in any event an error of the type relied on by plaintiffs does not show negligence or breach of contract on the part of defendant. It is apparent that plaintiffs have not stated and cannot state causes of action with respect to the first two counts, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend as to these counts.

Footnotes n1 Former section 715.1 of the Civil Code, as it read at the times involved here, provided: "The absolute power of alienation cannot be suspended, by any limitation or condition whatever, for a period longer than 21 years after some life in being at the creation of the interest and any period of gestation involved in the situation to which the limitation applies. The lives selected to govern the time of suspension must not be so numerous or so situated that evidence of their deaths is likely to be unreasonable difficult to obtain."

Section 715.2 reads as follows: "No interest in real or personal property shall be good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than 21 years after some life in being at the creation of the interest and any period of gestation involved in the situation to which the limitation applies. The lives selected to govern the time of vesting must not be so numerous or so situated that evidence of their deaths is likely to be unreasonably difficult to obtain. It is intended by the enactment of this section to make effective in this State the American common-law rule against perpetuities."

Former section 716, as it read at the times involved here, provided: "Every future interest is void in its creation which, by any possibility, may suspend the absolute power of alienation for a longer period than is prescribed in this chapter. Such power of alienation is suspended when there are no persons in being by whom an absolute interest in possession can be conveyed. The period of time during which an interest is destructible pursuant to the uncontrolled volition and for the exclusive personal benefit of the person having such a power of destruction is not to be included in determining the existence of a suspension of the absolute power of alienation or the permissible period for the vesting of an interest within the rule against perpetuities."

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